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ABSTRACT 
The ‘nation’ is a powerful social construct. How it is understood has significant consequences 
for a society and its people. Actors compete for the ability to define the ‘nation’ as a means to 
spread their views and influence. Consequently, the conceptualisation of the nation remains 
subject to discursive contest and susceptible to change.  
South Africa is no stranger to the nation being redefined. Pre-1994 South Africa was shaped 
by segregationist policies. During apartheid, race determined national identity and the 
relationship among racial groups. The different ethnic nations co-existed in the South African 
territory, but they did not do so as equals. Non-white populations were oppressed and exploited 
and this provoked a struggle, which culminated in the country’s liberation in the 1990s with a 
negotiated settlement.  
The 1994 election symbolically marked the beginning of post-apartheid South Africa. It was 
also used as an opportunity to promote a reinvented South African nation. This ‘new’ national 
identity was to be based on inclusivity, equality and diversity. Archbishop coined the term 
‘rainbow nation’ to reflect this vision for post-apartheid South Africa.  
The socio-political context in which South Africa as a nation is constructed has changed since 
1994. Political parties have started to strategically focus on difference in order to win or 
maintain political support (Sarakinsky, 2001). This led to the research question of how three 
important political parties in South Africa, namely the African National Congress (ANC), the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), construct South Africa 
as a nation.  
Bacchi’s (2004) concept ‘problem representation’ was applied to official political party 
documents and political parties’ social media to examine their respective constructions of the 
nation. Bacchi (2004) argues that by using problem representations one can identify certain 
underlying assumptions that are implicitly being promoted by the construction of the problem. 
The concept ‘problem representation’ was used to identify what assumptions underpin their 
construction of the South African nation by analysing constructions of public policy problems 
and by looking at what these political parties find problematic about the notion of a Rainbow 
Nation. 
The ANC and the DA share a commitment to the ‘rainbow nation’. Both parties see unity, 
diversity and equality as desirable and as the foundation of South African national identity. In 
contrast, the EFF rejects the 1994 national narrative. They do not regard it as a reimagination 
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of South African national identity and dispute the premise that the ‘new’ South Africa is based 
on the principles of equality, unity and diversity. According to the EFF, the nation remains 
ethnically, or racially, defined and black people remains subjugated. Support for the EFF 
indicates that political parties can benefit from promoting an alternative construction of the 
nation. However, discarding an inclusive, civic national identity can come at the cost of 
developing a more socially cohesive South Africa in the long run. 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
v 
 
OPSOMMING 
Die begrip ‘nasie’ is ‘n kragtige sosiale konstruksie.  Die verstaan hiervan het beduidende 
gevolge vir die samelewing en sy mense.  Die begrip word gebruik om beleid te formuleer en 
speel daarom ‘n groot rol in die vorming van standpunt en uitbreiding van invloed in die 
samelewing.  Gevolglik bly die konseptualisering van die ‘nasie’ onderhewig aan diskursiewe 
geskille en vatbaar vir verandering. 
Om ‘n nasie so te herdefinieer is natuurlik nie vreemd aan Suid-Afrika nie.  Voor 1994 was 
Suid-Afrika immers gevorm deur segregasie politiek.  Gedurende apartheid het ras, en die 
verhouding tussen verskillende rasse, die nasionale identiteit  bepaal.  Die verskillende etniese 
groepe het so as aparte groepe van mekaar bestaan - nie as gelykes van mekaar nie.  Nie-wit 
gemeenskappe is onderdruk en uitgebuit.  Dit het gely tot die bevrydingstryd wat uitgeloop het 
op die onderhandelde skikking in die 1990’s. 
Die 1994-verkiesing het egter die simboliese begin van post-apartheid Suid-Afrika beteken.  
Dit was ook ‘n geleentheid om ‘n ‘nuwe’ Suid-Afrikaanse nasie te vestig.  Inklusiwiteit, 
gelykheid en diversiteit sou die fondasie vir die ‘nuwe’ nasionale identiteit vorm.  Hiervoor het 
aartsbiskop Desmond Tutu die konsep van ‘n ‘reёnboognasie’ geskep.  Dit moes ‘n nuwe 
droom vir post-apartheid Suid-Afrika weerspieël.  
Die sosiale konteks waarin Suid-Afrika as ‘n nasie gevorm is, het egter sedert 1994 verander.  
Politieke partye het strategies al meer gefokus op verskille in ‘n poging om politieke steun te 
behou of te werf (Sarakinsky, 2001).  Dit het gely tot hierdie navorsing waarin die vraag 
beantwoord word oor hoe drie belangrike politieke partye in Suid-Afrika, naamlik die African 
National Congress (ANC), die Demokratiese Alliansie (DA) en die Ekonomiese 
Vryheidsvegters (EFF) Suid-Afrika as a nasie definieer.   
Bacchi (2004) se konsep van  ‘probleemvoorstelling’ is aangewend in die bestudering van 
amptelike dokumente en sosiale media van die verskillende politieke partye, om die verskille 
in die verstaan van ‘n ‘nasie’ uit te wys. Bacci (2004) voer aan dat deur die konsep van 
‘probleemvoorstelling’ onderliggende vertrekpunte reeds eksplisiet bevorder word.  Die 
konsep van ‘probleemvoorstelling’ is gebruik om te identifiseer watter aannames gebruik word 
in die konstruksie van die Suid-Afrikaanse nasie.  Dit is gedoen deur openbare beleidsprobleme 
te ontleed en agter te kom wat hierdie politieke partye as problematies ervaar in die idee van 
‘n Reënboognasie. 
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Die ANC en die DA deel ‘n verbintenis tot die konsep van ‘n ‘reёnboognasie’.  Albei partye 
sien eenheid, diversiteit en gelykheid as wenslik en as die grondslag in hul konstruksie van ‘n 
nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse nasie.  In teenstelling hiermee verwerp die EFF hierdie nasionale 
narratief van 1994.  Hulle beskou dit nie as 'n herkenning van Suid-Afrikaanse nasionale 
identiteit nie en betwis die veronderstelling dat die 'nuwe' Suid-Afrika gebaseer is op die 
beginsels van gelykheid, eenheid en diversiteit. Volgens die EFF bly die nasie etnies of 
rassisties gedefinieer en swartmense bly onderdruk. Ondersteuning vir die EFF dui daarop dat 
politieke partye wel voordeel kan trek uit die bevordering van 'n alternatiewe konstruksie van 
die nasie. Die wegdoen van 'n inklusiewe, burgerlike nasionale identiteit kan egter op die lange 
duur ten koste wees van ‘n groter eenheid (kohesie) tussen alle Suid-Afrikaners. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction and background 
South Africa may have existed as a unified territory since 1910, but it was not a nation. Instead, 
the land was shared by several ethnic nations, which existed in competition with one another. 
Segregationist policies had a significant role in creating this political, social and economic 
landscape. They rigidly classified people and ethnic groups according to race. The legislation 
discarded ethnic diversity within racial categories and so established ‘racial’ nations in South 
Africa. These legislated racial identities in turn determined the rights and freedoms people 
would be afforded, or denied, in South Africa. Given that segregation was heavily influenced 
by white supremacy, the white nation was invariably benefitted by these policies and usually 
at the cost of the non-white nations.  
Against expectations, this legislated system of racial oppression and exploitation was 
concluded relatively peacefully. Apartheid was brought to an end through a negotiated 
settlement and the 1994 election symbolically marked South Africa’s transition to a multi-
racial democracy. Post-apartheid South Africa was meant to be decidedly different to its 
predecessor. This included how the ‘nation’ should be viewed in South Africa. An express 
attempt was made to create a unified national identity. All South Africans would share in this 
collective identity, regardless of race or ethnicity. In terms of the nation, South Africa’s 
transition can be interpreted as a shift from an ethnic understanding of the nation to a civic one.  
Below the research provides a description of the nation as an ‘imagined community’. It gives 
an overview of what distinguishes such an ‘imagined community’ as an ethnic nation and as a 
civic nation. This brief outline also considers the possible implications an ethnic and a civic 
understanding view of the nation respectively have on the social capital. Neither version of the 
nation, however, is viewed as existing in perpetuity. A description of the nation, as a social 
construct, illustrates how the nation remains subject to change. Following this is a closer 
examination of the ‘nation’ in South Africa. The research shows how South Africa hosted 
several legislated communities that formed racial nations under apartheid. It then describes 
how a civic national identity was pursued in the wake of apartheid. The ‘rainbow nation’ 
represented this vision for post-apartheid South Africa and the research shows how the 1996 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the Constitution) supports this construction of 
the nation.  
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However, this chapter observes that South Africa has undergone several changes since 1994. 
One of these changes is the growing challenge to the rainbow nation. This led to the research 
question: how do the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and 
the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) construct South Africa as a nation? The rationale behind 
this question is described where it is supposed that there is a movement away from the 
interdependence promoted. A sentiment that seems to be supported by the EFF’s rejection for 
the rainbow nation and their growing support. Following this is the methodology section, which 
explains how Bacchi’s (2004) concept of ‘problem representation’ is used to guide the research 
and analysis. Chapter one concludes with a chapter outline.   
1.1.1. The nation: ethnic and civic 
The ‘nation’ has been notoriously difficult to define and multiple attempts have been made 
over time (Anderson, 1983: 12; Visvanathan, 2006: 533). For the purpose of this research, 
Anderson’s (1983: 15) definition of the nation is used. According to this definition, the nation 
is “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” 
(Anderson, 1983: 15).  
Anderson (1983: 15-16) explains his understanding of the nation as follows. Firstly, the nation 
is imagined given that its members consider themselves connected even though they have 
realistically never met, or even heard of, most of their fellow members (Anderson, 1983: 15). 
Secondly, the nation is limited (Anderson, 1983: 16). It has finite, if elastic boundaries, outside 
of which other nations exist. No nation is seen as coterminous with humanity (Anderson, 1983: 
16). Anderson (1983: 16) also characterises the nation as sovereign on the basis that it emerged 
during the Enlightenment and rejected the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical 
dynastic realm (Anderson, 1983: 16). Lastly, the nation is characterised as a community where 
a deep, horizontal comradeship exists among the members of the nation (Anderson, 1983: 16). 
This research is specifically interested in the implications of characterising the nation as 
limited, as imagined and as a community. These characteristics denote how the ‘nation’ 
separates people. As an ‘imagined community’, the nation creates an in-group in that it is used 
to denote a ‘unique people’ (Visvanathan, 2006: 533). As ‘insiders’, individuals can derive a 
form of identity from being members of a nation (Visvanathan, 2006: 533). The limited nature 
of the nation means that membership is not freely available to everyone. There are always 
people who are excluded from the nation and are part of the outgroup. What delineates the 
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distinction between who belongs and who does not, varies from nation to nation (Blaser, 2004: 
180). 
The characteristics used to define a nation’s borders, are influenced by whether said nation can 
be defined as ‘ethnic’ or as ‘civic’. Ethnic nations consist of people who are ‘ethnically 
bounded’ (Mukherji, 2010:2). Their common membership is determined by culture or 
ethnicity, which can be traced through common descent, shared historical experience and so 
on (Mukherji, 2010:2). These commonalities are not so much about choices people made, as it 
about the circumstances of birth. 
In contrast, civic nations are based on territory. Membership is extended to everyone who has 
a historic attachment to said territory (Lakoff, 2001; Kotze, 2012: 95). What connects the 
people to one another in this territory is a “central, national identity imposed on all citizens 
regardless of their cultural background” (Kotze, 2012: 95). These citizens gain the same 
obligations, rights and entitlements by virtue of their membership to the civic nation (Kotze, 
2012: 95). 
Ethic and civic nations show different ways in which a relationship is created among members 
of the same nation. This comradery is important and society can arguably not function without 
some sort of ‘fellow-feeling’ (Ariely, 2014: 573). Putnam (2007) uses social capital as a way 
to examine the relationship people have with others in their society. Social capital refers to the 
“social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness” (Putnam, 2007: 
137). It is frequently seen as an important dimension of social cohesion and these two concepts 
are regularly treated as synonymous (Ariely, 2014: 575). 
A high level of social capital is seen as essential to the maintenance of a prosperous society 
(Ariely, 2014: 574). According to Putnam (2007: 137), there is significant amount of evidence, 
which indicates that where levels of social capital are higher people live longer and happier 
lives. Children also grow up healthier, safer and better educated in these environments 
(Putnam, 2007: 138). Additionally, higher levels of social capital positively impact the 
economy and democracy (Putnam, 2007: 138). In terms of the latter, higher levels of social 
capital are seen as beneficial for democracy because it facilitates “peaceful collective action, 
inclusiveness, tolerance, confidence in institutions and political participation” (Ariely, 2014: 
573). Diversity, however, has the ability to adversely impact social capital.  
Most countries, especially post-colonial states, have heterogenous populations where a territory 
is shared by several ethnicities (Mukherji, 2010; Ramutsindela, 2007). Greater ethnic diversity 
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is associated with lower social capital (Putnam, 2007). Putnam (2007: 159) relates this to social 
identity, people’s sense of who they are. Social distance is less in cases where people share a 
common social identity and people are consequently likelier to trust and cooperate with one 
another.  
In contrast, where people are confronted with others who are too ‘unlike’ them, social distance 
is greater and it is more challenging for them to trust one another and to work together (Putnam, 
2007: 159). Putnam (2007) postulates that ethnic diversity triggers a ‘hunkering down’ 
response, which negatively effects social capital. Where people feel that ethnic diversity is 
threatening their collective identity, they respond by ‘hunkering down’ (Puntam, 2007; Ariely, 
2014: 573). They tend to withdraw from collective life and become less trusting (Putnam, 2007: 
150-151).  
‘Hunkering down’ is then not presented as the inevitable reaction to diversity but as people’s 
reaction when they feel as though their collective identity is being threatened by said 
differences. In this way, national identity, as a form of collective identity, can have a significant 
impact on social capital.  The nature of this national identity, ethnic or civic, should also be 
considered given that they relate differently to ethnic or cultural diversity.  
According to Mukherji (2010: 17), the relevance of ethnic differences is determined by how 
significant and socially pertinent society considers them to be. They do not automatically result 
in increased social distance. In an ethnic nation, however, these attributes have been 
internalised to the extent that members use it to distinguish themselves from other groups 
(Mukherji, 2010: 17). Cultural differences are at the core of their collective identity and this 
identity is likelier to be seen as under threat in the face of diversity. Although ethnic nations 
are not inherently conflictual, Lackoff (2001), Kotze (2012) and Visvanathan (2006) believe 
that they should be treated with caution exactly because it fosters rigid ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
categories. 
Where there is a civic national identity, social capital is less likely to be negatively influenced 
by diversity. In civic nations, national identity crosses cultural distinctions such as race, 
religion, ethnicity and language (Lakoff, 2001). They are united by a commitment to a shared 
set of values that are seen as necessary for the common good (Mukherji, 2010:18). There is 
still ethnic diversity but in a civic nation there is the expectation that people are able transcend 
their differences to share in a united national identity (Mukherji, 2010:18-19). Hence, ethnicity 
may retain its personal importance but its social salience is reduced. This shared national 
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identity allows diverse people to act as a united community. It fosters a poignant sense of 
belonging and unity within the territory (Kotze, 2012:95). It is therefore less likely that people 
when confronted by diversity respond by ‘hunkering down’. 
This is in line with Putnam’s (2007: 165) argument that the best way to minimise the adverse 
effects of diversity is by “creating a new, more capacious sense of ‘we’, a reconstruction of 
diversity that does not bleach out ethnic specificities”. National identity creates that ‘we’ in 
civic nations. It provides the conditions that let society to redraw social lines in a manner that 
transcends ancestry, which will allow societies to be both diverse and socially cohesive 
(Putnam, 2007: 161). While he accepts that it will take time and effort to deconstruct divisive 
ethnic identities, he believes that it is nevertheless possible and will be well worth the effort in 
the long run (Putnam, 2007: 165). 
1.1.2. The nation as a social construct 
According to Putnam (2007: 159), this shift in identity is possible because identity is socially 
constructed and can therefore be deconstructed and reconstructed. Anderson (1983: 13-14) 
regards the nation similarly where he argues that the only meaning that nations have is that 
which has been assigned to them by humans and these meanings can change over time. It is 
evident that Putnam (2007) and Anderson (1983) shares an ontological orientation, which is 
social constructionism.  
Social constructionism “the belief that social phenomena are in a constant state of change 
because they are totally reliant on social interactions as they take place” (Walliman, 2006: 4). 
This research is similarly orientated and this section looks at how the nation can be viewed as 
a social construct and consequently remains subject to change.  
The creation and existence of a social construct is dependent on social actors (Bryman, 2012: 
33; O’Leary, 2007: 251). In terms of the nation, this means that the nation only exists because 
people believe that it exists. As stated by Anderson (1983: 13-14), it is people who create the 
nation by assigning meaning to it. People create and promote ways of understanding the world 
through discourse (Burr, 1995: 250). ‘Discourse’ refers to the language actors use in association 
with a social phenomenon (Burr, 1995:250). These actors are embedded in their respective 
social realities and are consequently always influenced by their context (Punch, 2005: 222). 
Given variation in context and beliefs that impact actors, there is no universal discourse. 
Instead, people produce several overlapping, challenging or competing discourses (Punch, 
2005: 222; Burr, 1995: 285).  
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This is true in regards to the nation as well. Sutherland (2005) argues that the nation should not 
be taken for granted as people frequently do. What is understood as the ‘nation’ is not reflective 
of an ‘eternal’ truth but reflects one way in which it is understood at the time. Similarly, Strum 
(2007: 104) contends that nationalist events and symbols project the nation as consensual and 
timeless whereas in reality the nation is an ongoing site for contestation. The nation, as a social 
construct, is dynamic. Social constructs are constantly in a state of revision where they adapt 
and change according to the social context (Bryman, 2012: 33; Sutherland, 2005: 185; Walter, 
2011: 15; O’Leary, 2007: 252). This is in line with Anderson’s (1983:13-14) argument that to 
study the nation, a person must consider how people’s understanding of the nation as changed 
over time. 
Language plays a significant part in the creation of social constructs and is powerful in itself. 
According to Punch (2005: 222), language is a form of action. The way actors construct a 
specific discourse partly accomplishes an action with its ability to determine the nature of said 
action. Discourses have the ability to: 
“frame and constrain given courses of actions, some of which are promoted as 
sensible, moral and legitimate, thus commanding wide levels of support, whilst 
others are discouraged as stupid, immoral and illegitimate” (Burr, 1995: 250). 
Resultantly, discourse is a way to exert social regulation in a way that appears natural (Walter, 
2011: 146). This has become central to modern politics where politics can be interpreted as 
actors trying to control the dominant political language (Burr, 1995: 253; Sutherland, 2005: 
194).  
Political elites fight for the ability to define the nation given that powerful consequences follow 
the construction of the nation (Maxwell, 2006; Blaser, 2004; Visvanathan, 2006; Moodley & 
Adam, 2000; Kotze, 2012). For example, nationhood creates common sympathies amongst 
people that would not otherwise exist (Lackoff, 2001; Anderson, 1983: 15-16). This comradery 
motivates people to make immense sacrifices for the sake of the nation, such as being willing 
to kill or die for the nation (Anderson, 1983: 16). It also makes it easier to reaffirm people’s 
loyalties to the group and enforcing collective decisions (Kotze, 2012: 90). Additionally, there 
is greater recognition, rights and privileges that accompanies being a ‘nation’ versus a 
‘community’ (Maxwell, 2005: 405). The ‘nation’ has been found to be a powerful polemic tool 
(Maxwell, 2005: 385). The significance of how the nation is understood, places elites’ on-going 
interest in how the nation is defined into perspective (Sturm, 2007: 104). 
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However, the ability to control the dominant discourse is a reflection of power (Mengel, 2009: 
344). The most powerful in society dominate language and discourse and they are therefore in 
the ideal position to articulate social reality in a manner best suited to their interests (Burr, 
1995: 251; Punch, 2005: 221). Consequently, discourses can be seen as existing in a hierarchy 
that reflects the power dynamics among actors (Punch, 2005: 222). 
At the apex of this hierarchy is the ‘banal’ discourse, which is articulated by the current most 
influential elites. This refers to a discourse that is so widely accepted that it has become 
common sense (Parkes & Unterhalter, 2009: 382; Sutherland, 2005: 194). Even these 
discourses, however, are fallible (Burr, 1995: 254, 258). New discourses can disrupt ‘common 
sense’ ideas (Parkes & Unterhalter, 2009: 382). They can challenge, undermine and even 
replace the hegemonic discourse over time as old elites are replaced with the new (Burr, 1995: 
258). According to Sutherland (2005: 194), the nation can be seen as a dominant national 
construct. Nationalist movements attempt to undermine the dominance of the national 
construct, which is at that time part of the status quo. They disrupt the common understanding 
of the nation as a way to promote an identity crisis. Such a crisis provides them with the 
opportunity to mobilise support for their construction of the nation and rearticulate social 
reality in favour of their position. 
1.1.3. The changing idea of the nation in South Africa 
In South Africa, the way the nation has been understood has changed over time. Under 
apartheid, nations were treated as ethnically bound (Blaser, 2004:181-182). Segregationist 
policies, however, added a caveat to how ethnic nations existed in South Africa. These policies 
were first and foremost centred around race and divided the South African population into four 
racial categories: black, white, coloured and Asian. These groups were heterogenous and each 
contained several ethnic and linguistic subgroups but apartheid collapsed such intra-racial 
distinctions (Gibson, 2015: 42).  
Apartheid treated race as though it reflected ethnically homogenous groups and granted, or 
denied, rights accordingly. For example, the white population contained descendants of Dutch, 
English, French, German, Jewish, and other European settlers. They were further divided by 
language and a history of hostility and warfare (Gibson, 2015: 42). Apartheid made no such 
distinctions and all whites enjoyed the rights and privileges of belonging to the favoured racial 
category. Similarly, all black people were grouped together and denied political and civil rights 
regardless of their ethnic or linguistic affiliation. In effect, the collapse of these ethnic 
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difference created ‘racial’ nations in South Africa. In cognisance of this, the research uses racial 
labels, rather than ethnicity, to identify different nations in South Africa, such as the ‘white 
nation’ and the ‘black nation’. 
Race was kept socially salient throughout apartheid. Legislated racial identities meant that race 
was at the centre of collective identity under apartheid. Additionally, it became the source of 
significant social distance among racial groups in South Africa. This was an intended 
consequence of apartheid, which, as the name suggests, was meant to minimise inter-racial 
contact. Moreover, white supremacy was an inherent part of apartheid and the result was “a 
closed, all-embracing system of racist colonialism and racial capitalism” (Saul, 2014: 64). 
Hence, where members of different races came into contact, it was not as equals. 
These legislated racial identities, however, ended with apartheid (Moodley, 2000: 51).  Their 
termination gave South Africa the opportunity to re-invent collective identity in South Africa 
(Hartley, 2014: 8). It was not an uncontested issue but at the first round of the CODESA talks 
majority political parties “declared for an undivided South Africa with one nation” 
(Ramutsindela, 2001: 31). This became the dominant construction of the nation given that it 
was incorporated in South Africa’s supreme law, the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (the Constitution). The Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996) envisages post-
apartheid South Africa as “[belonging] to all who live in it, united in [their] diversity”.   
This construction is in line with a civic view of the nation. Ethnic differences retain their 
personal importance as diversity is embraced and celebrated. Moreover, sections 30 and 31 of 
the Constitution guarantees individuals and communities the right to practice the language and 
culture of their choice (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The social salience of these and other 
distinctions such as race, however, is reduced. The Constitution inhibits unfair discrimination 
and so limits the significance of ethnic and racial diversity in the public sphere.    
There is also the expectation that South Africans would be able to transcend their differences 
and that they would be united in their diversity (Moodley, 2000: 51; Ramutsindela, 2001: 34; 
Villa-Vicencio & Soko, 2012: 16; Republic of South Africa, 1996). They will be united by a 
new shared South African identity (Hartley, 2014: 8; Ramutsindela, 2001: 31). One that was 
inclusive of “all who comprise the South African polity as it is [and would be] commonly 
shared by every South African, regardless of race, gender, religion, and ethnicity” (Kotze, 
2012: 105).  
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Non-racialism would be at the core of this collective South African identity and be the shared 
ideology behind which all South Africans could unite (Kotze, 2012:91; Blaser, 2004:185). 
Non-racialism was meant to create non-racial citizens who co-existed peacefully in an 
integrated setting (Kotze, 2012:94). It also means that race, which defined the previous era, 
would be reduced to irrelevance in the public sphere (Moodley, 2000: 51; Ramutsindela, 2001: 
32). This is reinforced by the Constitution’s equality clause that prohibits unfair discrimination 
based on, amongst other grounds, race (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The South African 
national identity can then be seen as a balancing act between the multiculturalism that is 
promoted by diversity and the non-racialism that is presented as the core of South Africa’s 
collective identity.  
Archbishop Desmond Tutu coined the term ‘rainbow nation’ to describe this vision of post-
apartheid South Africa, where its people would be united in their diversity (Buqa, 2015: 1; 
Gibson, 2015: 42). This thesis uses the term to denote this vision of South Africa as a civic 
nation as described above. 
1.1.4. Is the rainbow nation a fading ideal? 
Many people believed that only a civil war would end the apartheid state (Gibson, 2015: 41). 
Against expectations though, South Africa made a mostly peaceful transition from a racist 
authoritarian state to a multiracial democracy (Gibson, 2015: 41). According to Hartley (2014: 
30), this would not have been possible without the idea of the rainbow nation. Its inclusive, 
non-discriminative vision played a crucial role in winning over a large portion of terrified 
whites who feared retribution (Hartley, 2014: 57; Newman, 2014: 37). This in turn had the 
effect of isolating and marginalising right-wing organisations that supported pre-1994 rhetoric 
and were seen as inviting retribution (Maxwell, 2005: 32; 2014: 58). 
Additionally, the rainbow nation has the ability to impact South African democracy in the long 
run. It is more difficult to develop a democratic state in heterogeneous countries (Gibson, 2015: 
41). This is because it is a greater challenge to foster social cohesion in countries that are 
racially and ethnically diverse (Gibson, 2015: 41; Putnam, 2007). Moreover, the more diverse 
the country is, the more social cohesion is needed to sustain a well-functioning society (Kotze, 
2012: 95). According to Kotze (2012), a democracy cannot function without social cohesion.  
One of the challenges in post-apartheid South Africa is building social capital. Not only is 
South Africa a very diverse country, inter-racial tensions fostered under apartheid would need 
to be addressed. Gibson (2015: 41) argues that South Africa’s multi-racial democracy will not 
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survive unless antagonism among its race and ethnic groups is reduced. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) began to address this tension by laying the foundation for 
a new South Africa where different races could live together without a sense of mutual threat 
(Edwards, 2009: 47). This symbolic unity was an important attempt to evoke feelings of 
belonging (Blaser, 2004: 186).  
The rainbow nation represents a more long-term solution. It is a broad and inclusive collective 
identity and can be used to create new forms of social solidarity in diverse nations (Putnam, 
2007). Putnam (2007), however, makes the point that this is not easily done. He argues that 
“deconstructing divisive racial and ethnic identities will not be so quick and simple” (Putnam, 
2007: 159). Moreover, the benefits of this more capacious sense of ‘we’, such as an increase in 
social capital, will not be felt immediately (Putnam, 2007: 164). For the social capital benefits 
to be realised in the long-run, the rainbow nation must first survive more immediate challenges. 
According to Hartley (2014: 7), there are many difficult questions and circumstances that are 
preventing the rainbow nation narrative from maintaining its momentum in post-apartheid 
South Africa. This ‘new’ South Africa cannot only exist at abstract levels but needs to be 
reinforced by real change (Hartley, 2014: 7). For many people, post-apartheid South Africa 
and its government have failed to live up to expectations (Valji, 2003; Du Preez, 2013; Ford, 
2011; Gobodo-Madikizela, 2009; Park 2011).  
South Africa is still faced with numerous social and economic challenges that have not been 
addressed (Gibson, 2015: 41). This includes the slow pace at which racial relations are 
improving (Gibson, 2015). There are those who argue that the opposite is in fact happening 
and that people are moving away from and not towards non-racialism (Vincent & Howell, 
2014: 89). These persisting socio-economic challenges have led to South Africa to a second 
interregnum where the notion of the rainbow nation is specifically being challenged (Ford, 
2011).  
The rationale of this research is that if there is widespread challenge to the rainbow nation, 
political parties may be motivated to pursue alternative constructions of the South African 
nation. A shared civic national identity may benefit societies in the long run, political parties 
are orientated around a more immediate future. Political parties, which host the political elite 
in South Africa, gain power from elections. These elections are held every few years and 
therefore political parties may be tempted to pursue strategies with short term gain. If people 
are becoming increasingly sceptical of the rainbow nation, political parties may benefit by 
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doing the same. They can gain people’s support by providing an alternative construction of the 
South African nation.  
This led to the research question: how do the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa 
as a nation. What South Africa stands to gain or lose if the Rainbow Nation should be displaced, 
depends on what are offered as alternatives. The approach used to examine these constructions 
falls under discourse analysis.  
1.2 Methodology 
Discourse analysis is a qualitative method used to study social constructs (Punch, 2005: 224). 
According to Punch (2005: 222), the basis of all discourse analysis is the assumptions of 
construction, variability and action. Firstly, it builds on the premise that “reality is socially 
constructed by people, who give meaning and significance to objects in the material world” 
(Burr, 1995: 250). Hence, discourse analysis is inherently constructionist (Bryman, 2012: 529).  
It also gives special consideration to the role language plays in shaping these constructs (Punch, 
2005: 222).  
Secondly, discourse analysis assumes that discourses are infinitely varied, as actors construct 
their discourses out of a range of styles, linguistic resources and rhetorical devices (Punch, 
2005: 222). Actors specifically create discourses in a way that is reflective of their specific 
interests and assumptions. These interests and assumptions can vary significantly. 
Consequently, multiple discourses develop and compete with, overlap and challenge one 
another (Punch, 2005: 222; Burr, 1995: 258). Discourse analysis is interested in uncovering 
these assumptions and interests (Punch, 2005: 224; Burr, 1995: 250).   
Lastly, discourse analysis considers discourse to be a form of action (Bryman, 2012: 530). 
According to Punch (2005: 222), “people perform actions of different kinds through their talk 
and their writing and they accomplish the nature of these actions through constructing their 
[specific] discourse”. An example, in terms of the nation would be, of how the language used 
to construct the nation leads to the exclusion or inclusion of certain people. 
These are the common themes that unite diverse bodies of theory, method and practice as 
‘discourse analysis’. Bacchi (2004) falls under this scope with her concept of problem 
representations. ‘Problem representations’ is part of Bacchi’s (1999: 21) What’s the problem? 
Approach and “argues that every postulated ‘solution’ has built into it a particular 
representation of what the problem is, and it is these representations, and their implications that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
 
[needs to be examined]” (Bacchi, 1999: 21). Bacchi (1999; 2000; 2004) does not see people 
responding to ‘problems’ which exists ‘out there’ (Bacchi, 1999; 2000; 2004).  
Problems, according to Bacchi (2004), are always constructed and do not exist outside of their 
representation. Inherent in these problem representations are frameworks of meaning and 
assumptions that are automatically promoted due to how the problem is constructed (Bacchi, 
2004: 134). These meanings and assumptions are implicit in both the problem representation 
and what are considered as viable and acceptable solutions.  
Bacchi’s (2004) concept of ‘problem representation’ was used to identify what assumptions 
underpin the ANC’s, the DA’s and the EFF’s respective constructions of the South African 
nation. This was done by looking at what these parties consider to be ‘problematic’ about the 
rainbow nation. What they identify as problematic, indicates what they respectively find 
undesirable about the construction of South Africa as the rainbow nation. What is left as 
‘unproblematic’ is similarly significant given that it indicates what the parties’ approve of in 
terms of the South African national identity. Additionally, the concept of problem 
representation was used to identify the parties’ underlying assumptions about their construction 
of the nation by analysing their constructions of public policy problems. It is presumed that 
these problem constructions are also be indicative of how the parties construct the nation. 
Moreover, given that the parties do not explicitly use these representations of policy issues to 
promote a national identity, they may provide a different perspective of how the parties each 
construct the nation in contrast to their explicit discussion of the South African nation.  
1.2.1 Data collection 
Relevant political party documents and social media were used to analyse how South Africa’s 
three biggest political parties, namely the ANC, the DA and the EFF, construct the South 
African nation. Sources were considered if they fell within the time frame from 26 July 2013 
to 3 August 2016. This time frame takes into account the existence of all three parties given 
that the EFF did not exist until 26 July 2013 and concludes with the 2016 local elections.  
Sources had to concern the construction of the South African national identity. This included 
explicit descriptions of South African nationhood as well as the characteristics the parties’ 
associate with it. The characteristics of ethnic and civic nations were specifically kept in mind. 
Alternatively, material was considered relevant where it referred to the construction of policy 
issues which contains underlying assumptions the respective party has of the nation.  
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1.2.1.1 Documents 
The core party documents, their constitutions and founding manifestos, were considered where 
appropriate.  These documents were chosen even if they were not written during the stated time 
frame, for their significance within the party. They set out the rules, aims and guidelines of 
their party. Theoretically, they are the foundational basis of all the parties’ ideas, actions and 
behaviour. Consequently, views about the nation that these documents contain should be the 
basis of their construction. It should inform how they construct the nation in other sources.  
For a political party to control the dominant discourse, it must promote said discourse to the 
public. Hence, the parties’ speeches and election manifestos were examined. Speeches provide 
a political party with the opportunity to advance their discourse amongst the public. Only the 
speeches made by Jacob Zuma, Helen Zille, Mmusi Maimane and Julius Malema were 
considered given their positions as party leaders. During this period Zuma was president of the 
ANC. Their constitution sets out that the duties and functions of this position are to present the 
views and attitudes of the organisation and orient and direct the activities of the ANC (ANC, 
2012). Zille was leader of the DA until she was succeeded by Maimane. As leader, they were 
respectively obligated to be the “spokesperson of the Party at home and abroad” (DA, 2015: 
52). Malema as the president and commander in chief is the political head and spokesperson 
of the EFF (EFF, 2014).  
Election manifestos are similarly a platform where parties explicitly express their values and 
priorities to the people. They fight for political power on the basis of the content of their 
manifestos. Their media statements similarly provide an opportunity for the party to provide 
their interpretations of issues and consequently promote their discourse. Hence, both sources 
play a significant role in establishing the parties’ respective discourses amongst the public.  
1.2.1.2 Social media 
The Internet has played a significant role in confronting obstacles to communication (Merry, 
2015: 374). Messages on the Internet can spread to a great many people with relatively little 
effort regardless of distance. This social media has become increasingly prominent in politics 
(Merry, 2015: 373). Politicians are increasingly using social media to frame issues, which is an 
essential part of politics (Merry, 2015: 373, 375). It is evident that social media have played an 
increasing role in creating and contesting discourses. Hence, the political parties’ use Twitter 
and YouTube to construct the South African nation was considered. 
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According to Merry (2015: 374-375), Twitter is especially useful in influencing narratives 
given its rapid speed and its large potential audiences. The character limitation creates brief 
and simple messages. This allows for information to be rapidly diffused. The limitation also 
means that the party has to carefully prioritise what it wants to say. Moreover, Twitter is quick 
and easy to use. Consequently, it is a platform that political parties can use to easily and 
frequently communicate with the public. Hence, tweets were used to fill the gaps between the 
documents, which are published or altered less often. Twitter feeds only reflect tweets dating 
back a few months prior at most. To view the tweets from years prior the advanced Twitter 
search was used 
YouTube videos are not as frequently used. However, like Twitter, it shows how discourses 
can be promoted using multi-media. Videos are not limited to text. They contain a visual and 
an auditory component as well. This allows discourses to be promoted implicitly and explicitly 
in a different manner. Supporting visuals can, for example, implicitly establish connections 
that text cannot. Videos and images can also be tweeted. Therefore, these sources were 
examined to complement construction of the nation via text.  
1.2.2 Data analysis  
Bacchi (2004) directed this study of South Africa as a nation. It was once desirable to define 
South Africa as the rainbow nation. It was examined whether or not this is the contemporary 
position of the ANC, the DA and the EFF respectively. Bacchi (2004: 131) argues that problem 
representations are underpinned by assumptions, which influences the consequences that 
follow. What is left as unproblematic is also significant (Bacchi, 2004: 131). It is an indication 
of what actors do not feel the need to scrutinise. According to Bacchi (2004: 131), this indicates 
what is likely to change and what is likely to stay the same.  
This concept was applied to the political parties’ views of the South African nation. What they 
see as problematic is seen as being opposed to the parties’ respective constructions of the nation 
and therefore something that they would prefer to change. Characteristics of the rainbow nation 
that they do not see as problematic, are presumed to be part of their views of the nation. How 
they relate to reconciliation and Nelson Mandela was also considered. Both of these have 
symbolic value regarding South Africa as the rainbow nation. Reconciliation was seen as a 
necessary requirement for the ‘new’ nation to be established. Nelson Mandela is frequently 
seen as the symbolic figurehead of this ‘new’ South Africa (Buqa, 2015:1).  
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Additionally, the parties’ problem representations of policy issues were researched. While 
these policy issues are not directly about the nation, the parties’ respective assumptions about 
the nation can still influence their construction of the problem. These assumptions are 
underlying. Bacchi (2004) contends that they are revealed by how the problem is framed as 
well as by looking at what are postulated as ‘solutions’ (Bacchi, 2004: 131). These implicit 
assumptions provide an additional perspective to how the parties each view South African 
national identity.  
1.3 Chapter Outline 
In this chapter the ‘nation’ was defined as “an imagined political community – and imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1983: 15). The distinction between the 
ethnic nation and the civic nation was explored as well as how each, as a collective identity, 
can influence social capital in a diverse society. These identities are not set and this chapter 
regarded how the meaning of the nation can change by examining it as a social construct.  
This chapter illustrated the South African shift from ethnic national identities under apartheid 
to a civic national identity in the form of the rainbow nation. The latter construction of the 
nation, however, is under pressure in post-apartheid South Africa. This has led to the question 
of how South Africa’s three biggest political parties construct South Africa as a nation, which 
is rationalised in this chapter on the basis that increased discontent with the notion of the 
rainbow nation may motivate political parties to pursue alternative constructions of the nation. 
Chapter one is concluded with description how Bacchi’s (2004) concept of ‘problem 
representations’ was applied to research the political parties’ respective constructions of the 
nation.  
The literature review follows in chapter two. It begins with an examination of how academic 
works have regarded the ‘nation’ as a social construct. South Africa is not alluded to in this 
section but the perspective of the rainbow nation as a social construct is implicit in the 
descriptive accounts of its creation. Literature regarding post-apartheid South Africa has a 
different focus. These works illustrate how the rainbow nation is struggling to maintain 
momentum in post-apartheid South Africa. The literature indicates that nation-building is an 
uncompleted project in South Africa and how post-apartheid South Africa has failed to live up 
to the ideal of the rainbow nation. The literature review also illustrates different approaches 
that have been used when studying the nation and how Bacchi (2004) has previously been used. 
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Given that social constructs are dependent on social actors and their context, chapter three 
provides a brief overview of the ANC, the DA and the EFF as political parties. This chapter 
briefly describes the parties’ respective histories, ideology and political positions in 
contemporary South African politics. Chapter four looks at how these parties construct South 
Africa as a nation. The ANC and the DA construct South Africa along the lines of the rainbow 
nation. The EFF does not and they regard race as the defining feature of national identity in 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
These findings are discussed in chapter five and the thesis concluded. While the ANC and the 
DA are positioned as political opponents in South Africa, they both commit to the construction 
of South Africa as the rainbow nation. They are not competing for the opportunity to re-
articulate national identity in South Africa, but are in contest with one to be seen as the main 
proponent for the rainbow nation. Their support has kept the rainbow nation salient and relevant 
in post-apartheid South Africa. However, this thesis is limited in that it does not consider how 
their actions are aligned with their verbal support. For the benefits of a collective South African 
identity to be realised in the long run, the ANC and the DA must be steadfast in their support 
even at the cost of immediate political gain. These parties could benefit from abandoning the 
civic national identity as is illustrated by the EFF’s rejection of the rainbow nation and rapid 
growth. However, this will come at the cost of developing a more socially cohesive South 
Africa.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how the nation as been studied as a social construct and illustrates how 
the nation can be viewed as constructed, mostly by political elites, and subject to contestation. 
These works do not specifically look at how this applies to the South African nation. However, 
descriptive accounts of the rainbow nation’s creation implicitly treat the South African nation 
as a social construct. There is also an acknowledgement in the literature that the rainbow nation 
is subject to re-articulation. This is made evident in academic works, which argue that South 
Africa is moving away from the ideals of the rainbow nation. Additionally, the literature 
indicates how the reality of post-apartheid South Africa has not lived up to the expectations of 
the ‘new’ South Africa.  
Additionally, this chapter contains an overview of different methods that have been used when 
studying the nation as a construct, such as by examining the role signs and social capital 
respectively have on the way the nation is understood. This chapter also indicates the different 
ways in which Bacchi (2004) has been used in the academics.  
2.2 The nation as a hegemonic social construct 
Several works regard the nation and as a dominant social construct. These works concur that 
elites play a significant role creation of national identity and compete for the ability to do so in 
an attempt to further their interests. Sutherland (2005) explains this in terms of ‘discourse 
theory’. According to her, political actors have a significant interest in controlling discourses 
given that dominant discourses can be used to legitimise the status quo. These elites then 
“perpetuate power through the knowledge (and ‘truth’) contained in the predominant 
discourse” (Sutherland, 2005: 189). By propagating and consolidating it, political actors can 
manufacture the consent needed for them to exercise their authority (Sutherland, 2005: 189). 
Additionally, the national discourse can be used as a means to mobilise people (Sutherland, 
2005: 186). 
Similarly, Sturm (2007: 104) shows elite groups as being “constantly engaged in a vital and 
ongoing intellectual debate concerning how the nation should be presented”. This creates a 
process where the nation is continuously created and re-created by elites to revitalise its appeal 
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to the majority of national citizens (Sturm, 2007: 104). Sturm (2007: 104) argues that this active 
reinvention is essential to the survival of the nation.  
Maxwell (2006: 385) likewise depicts the nation as a rhetorical device, one which has become 
a popular polemical tool. He illustrates how political actors have used the ‘nation’ to make 
political arguments (Maxwell, 2006). Visvanathan (2006: 536) also emphasises how political 
actors tend to use the ‘nation’ to further their interests. Blaser (2004: 181) and Moodley and 
Adam (2000: 54) support this view, stating that national discourses have less to do with 
authentic interests and more with political contest.   
Literature that views the nation as constructed also agree that the nation is never finalised. 
According to the literature, the elite can at best establish their discourse as hegemonic. 
Sutherland (2005) gives special consideration to the concept of hegemony in her discussion of 
nationalism. She argues that hegemony may result in a period of stability, but that discourses, 
regardless of dominance, remain unstable (Sutherland, 2005: 187, 195).  
She explains that hegemonic discourses are unstable because their dominance is indicative of 
relations of power and resistance (Sutherland, 2005: 187). It changes because the power that 
allowed for its articulation is precarious and subject to resistance and change. When the nation 
is viewed in terms of hegemony, Sutherland (2005: 185, 195) shows that the political actors 
compete to define the national ‘nodal point’. This gives them the opportunity to articulate their 
common-sense idea, which determines the identity of the different groups (Sutherland, 2005: 
191), giving them the ability to define the ‘Other’ in the nation-state (Sutherland, 2005: 190).  
Sturm (2007) agrees with Sutherland (2005) that the constructions of the nations are 
consistently being challenged. He argues that nationalist symbols and events intend to present 
a unique and united nation. However, in reality nations are not exemplars of consensus but “the 
result of ongoing contestation” (Sturm, 2007: 104). Visvanathan (2006) holds a similar stance 
even though he does not specifically consider the concept of hegemony. He notes how rapidly 
signs can be reversed once a new understanding of the nation emerges (Visvanathan, 2006: 
537). 
Even though the literature shows national constructs in contest with one another, there is the 
view that these constructs are not automatically exclusionary. Sturm (2007: 105) argues that 
nations can both co-exist and compete with one another. He and Maxwell (2006) both look at 
how people can commit to multiple nations at the same time. Maxwell (2006) illustrates how 
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Slovaks saw their membership of the Slavic nations as compatible with membership of the 
Hungarian civic nation (Maxwell, 2006: 400). 
These works indicate how understanding of the nation is dynamic and that political elites have 
a vested interest in this process. Political elites are depicted as interested in controlling the 
discourse because it is a means to promote their values and further their interests. While these 
works do not refer to South Africa specifically, descriptive accounts regarding the construction 
of the rainbow nation illustrate how the South African nation can be viewed through this lens.  
2.2 The ‘rainbow nation’ as a dominant national construct 
There are several works dedicated to South Africa’s transition and the establishment of the 
rainbow nation. These works, implicitly or explicitly, regard the rainbow nation as a social 
construct. This is evident in the way that it is treated as constructed and the role of political 
elites in creating this construction is emphasised. Furthermore, this national identity is regarded 
as variable given that it is depicted as an option that the political pursued. This construction of 
the nation was pursued according to the literature as a means to promote political and economic 
stability as well as a means to foster social capital in South Africa. 
Kotze (2012), Blaser (2004) and Rajput (2011) explicitly identify national identity as being 
constructed in South African. This is depicted as true for national identities both before and 
after 1994. Valji (2003: 24) similarly reveals a constructionist orientation. He describes the 
new South Africa as an imagined community based on the foundational myth known as the 
‘rainbow nation’ (Valji, 2003: 24). Ramutsindela (2001), Johnson (2009) and Leon (2008: 235) 
describe the rainbow nation as a constructed political product. Hence, they also support the 
social constructionist perspective of the rainbow nation, albeit implicitly. 
According to Hartley (2014: 4), the rainbow nation was a “vast social pact engineered in the 
backrooms of negotiations by those who had put aside conflict in favour of a political 
settlement”. This is indicative not only of a constructionist orientation, but also acknowledges 
the role the political elite had in its construction. This influences Hartley’s (2014: 1) critique 
of South Africa’s transition being depicted as a “miracle”. He argues that while the label 
effectively captures the magnitude of events, it glosses over the invested effort that made it 
possible (2014: 1). To him it does not sufficiently acknowledge that the rainbow nation exists 
because of “hard work and difficult compromises by political leaders across a wide spectrum” 
(Hartley, 2014: 1). Likewise, Ramutsindela (2001), Johnson (2009) and Leon (2008: 235) 
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emphasise the actions of the political actors that made the pursuit of an inclusive South African 
identity possible. These descriptive accounts implicitly depict political elites as responsible for 
the creation of the national construct. 
According to Rajput (2011), Kotze (2012) and Blaser (2004), the South African elite as 
responsible for nation-building. Rajput (2011: 3) states that after 1994, “nation building 
became a national governmental preoccupation”. Kotze (2012) similarly argues that the 
creation of the nation was the elite’s responsibility. Blaser (2004) acknowledges that the 
political elite has had a significant role in creating the post-apartheid South African nation. He, 
however, is more hesitant to attribute sole responsibility for the creation of a national identity 
to political elites.  
Moreover, the political elite are depicted as pursuing the specifically rainbow nation for 
specific outcomes where this national identity was pursued for the implications it would have 
on South Africa. According to Kotze (2012), non-racialism was pursued as the basis for the 
new South Africa to serve as the ideological ‘glue’ to create a sense of South African 
nationhood in a post-apartheid context. Additionally, it was pursued to explicitly break from 
the ethnic and exclusionary nationalism that defined South Africa previously (Kotze, 2012). 
Moodley and Adam (2000) and Blaser (2004) concur that it was a means to lay a non-racial 
foundation for the new South African nation. This would move South Africa from the racial 
antagonisms that previously defined it and it would create a civic nation that would be inclusive 
and promote equality. 
The creation of a ‘new’ shared South Africa, can also be viewed in terms of social capital. 
Putnam (2007: 137) refers to social capital as the “social networks and the associated norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness”. He distinguishes between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social 
capital. The former refers to ties to people that are similar to one another in an important way 
(Putnam, 2007: 143). ‘Binding’ social capital connects people who are unlike one another in a 
significant manner (Putnam, 2007: 143). A shared and inclusive identity can be used to increase 
the both forms of social capital of a diverse population. The nature of apartheid restrained 
interracial ties among people and the rainbow nation can be interpreted as an attempt by the 
political elite to facilitate the creation of social capital in the ‘new’ South Africa. 
This is supported by both Ramutsindela (2001) and Valji, (2003) who describe the rainbow 
nation as a nation-building attempt, one that was centred on the establishment of the civic 
nation. Valji (2003: 18, 25-26) states that the intention of this particular nation-building project 
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was to establish a common identity that would be inclusive of all South Africans, regardless of 
their differences. Similarly, Ramutsindela (2001:34) argues that the Rainbow Nation was a way 
for the ANC to promote their vision of a “non-racial society in which race and ethnicity cannot 
be used as building blocks for a new South Africanism” (Ramutsindela, 2001: 32). Ford (2011: 
267-268) also associates these features with the nationalism promoted by Mandela, one which 
she describes as where the “attachment to one’s own does not preclude fellowship with the 
other”. The description of the rainbow nation alludes to the characteristics associated with a 
civic nation. 
Additionally, the literature depicts how the Rainbow Nation was pursued as a means to guard 
South Africa’s economy and democratic stability. According to Newman and De Lannoy 
(2014: 37), Johnson (2009: 6-7) and Du Preez (2013: 12-13), this national identity was a way 
to appease the white minority and the business community. Its focus on inclusivity and equality 
consequently helped to prevent the destruction of the South African economy. In terms of 
stability, Hartley (2014:30) believes that “South Africa might not have become a stable 
democracy of the late 1990s without Mandela’s emphasis on inclusivity”. Hartley, (2014) along 
with Du Preez (2013) argue that the inclusive nature of the Rainbow Nation not only won over 
a large portion of terrified whites but also managed to marginalize and isolate political 
organisations that continued with their pre-1994 rhetoric. Blaser (2004), for all his critique of 
the rainbow nation, agrees that the creation of a symbolically united nation played an essential 
part in advancing stability, especially during the transition years. 
The literature also shows that political elites were invested in establishing South Africa as the 
rainbow nation.  Blaser (2004: 179) specifically describes it as being established as the 
dominant rhetoric. What is evident in the literature is that its prevalence was not a given. An 
inclusive South African identity is depicted as an option that the political elites had and chose 
to pursue. According to the literature, South Africa could have taken an alternative path and 
this would have significantly impacted South Africa as a country and as a nation (Du Preez, 
2013: 33; Cronje, 2014: 2; Valji, 2003: 18; Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 152). These works 
argue that if the Rainbow Nation was not pursued, there would have been continued violence. 
Additionally, the country and the economy would have been plunged into instability. Du Preez 
(2013: 33) and Valji (2003: 18) also emphasise that the rainbow nation was an option as argues 
that people needed to be persuaded to pursue this discourse.  
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Moreover, Ramutsindela (2001), Hartley (2014) and Du Preez (2013) depict the rainbow nation 
of only ever having a delicate dominance. The political elite are depicted as promoting the 
Rainbow Nation even at personal cost. According to Hartley (2014: 51), they did so because 
“the country had made a pact, and to disturb it would undo a decade of compromise”.  
Moreover, the literature indicates how the elites took steps to enforce the Rainbow Nation as 
the dominant national construct. For example, its underlying values of inclusivity and equality 
were enshrined in South Africa’s supreme law, the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (Ramutsindela, 2001: 3, Hartley, 2014: 51). The TRC is also depicted as being 
established to create the foundation of the so-called Rainbow Nation (Moodley & Adam, 2000: 
51; Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 224; Johnson, 2009: 272; Klein, 2009: 113; Edwards, 2009: 
47). These efforts were undertaken to promote the rainbow nation in newly multi-racial and 
democratic South Africa. Efforts to advance this discourse have since then been lessened.  
2.3 National identity following 1994 
There is a consensus in the literature that nation-building remain a concern in post-apartheid 
South Africa. According to Ramutsindela (2001: 4), “the realization of [the Rainbow Nation] 
hinges very much on post-apartheid national strategies and their outcomes”. Ramutsindela 
(2001) and Cronje (2014) both argue that nation-building needs to be seen as an on-going 
process, particularly as South Africa’s internal space has not yet successfully been rearranged 
to reflect the Rainbow Nation ideal. Kotze (2012: 95) argues that significant effort needs to be 
invested in South African nation-building given that South Africa is very diverse and requires 
greater cohesion for its society to be sustained.  Moodley and Adam (2000) share this 
sentiment. They state that “a South African nation has yet to be born. South Africa at present 
constitutes an economic and political entity, but not an emotional one” (Moodley & Adam, 
2000: 67).  
Yet Du Preez (2013) notes that the nation-building project has been largely abandoned after 
the Mandela presidency. The literature indicates that instead of the rainbow nation being 
advanced in post-apartheid South Africa, South Africans are moving away from this 
construction of the nation, especially in terms of race. Vincent and Howell (2014: 89) argue 
that “far from a slow progression towards the ideals of a deepening non-racialism, then, the 
post-apartheid period has witnessed a process of re-racialisation in which the terms of racial 
discourse have altered”. Moodley and Adam (2000: 54) and Blaser (2004) agree that South 
African nationalism has not entrenched non-racialism.  
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On the contrary, ethno-racial consciousness is shown as having increased since 1994. 
According to Moodley and Adam (2000: 54), the end of legalised racism has ironically 
increased racial assertiveness. Blaser (2004: 179) argues that under the Mbeki presidency the 
nation-building project moved away from non-racialism to black nationalism. Furthermore, he 
believes that this “'renewed ethno-racial consciousness’, may indeed mean ‘the demise of the 
non-racial dream’” (Blaser, 2004: 186). 
According to Ford (2011), South Africa has entered a second interregnum where the notion of 
the rainbow nation is specifically being challenged. She believes politicians are pursuing 
alternative constructions of the nation because they stand to gain politically from challenging 
the 1994 narrative. Ramutsindela (2001: 24), Hartley (2014: 57) and Van Onselen (2015: 6) all 
agree that control over the national identity can be a source of political power for South African 
politicians. Successive South African governments have manipulated the identities of the 
different South African population groups to suit their needs in the past (Ramutsindela, 2001: 
24). This is depicted as an on-going trend in South Africa.  
According to Sarakinsky (2001:150), politicians have abandoned the carefully constructed 
image of interdependence that was advanced since the transition. They have done so in the 
“belief that stressing the differences between groups and parties is the only successful way to 
win and hold popular support” (Sarakinsky, 2001: 150). Hartley (2014: 25) agrees and argues 
that it is easier to mobilise support and to promote internal party coherence when old fault lines 
are made to create an external enemy. Du Preez (2013), Maré (2011) and Johnson (2009) agree 
that race is purposely kept salient because it has been a useful political tool, despite the 
contradiction with the official discourse.  
Nevertheless, literature regarding the post-apartheid period is limited. Van Onselen (2015) 
notes this gap. He argues that South Africa is treated as being almost apolitical after its 
transition, even if South Africa has been an inclusive democracy long enough “for a range of 
new influences to manifest themselves, distinct from our past, even if informed by it” (Van 
Onselen, 2015: 11). The literature shows that the rainbow nation is struggling to gain traction 
in post-apartheid South Africa. It, however, only gives a cursory examination to contesting 
discourses. This thesis examines how this has affected current construction of the South 
African nation and how said constructions relate to the notion of the Rainbow Nation or not. 
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2.4 The ‘rainbow nation’ as an unattained ideal 
Beyond its construction, the rainbow nation is frequently treated as a set of expectations 
regarding post-apartheid South Africa that have not been met as opposed to a construction of 
national identity. Progress is measured against these expectations and the literature frequently 
observes how post-1994 South Africa has been found lacking. Valji (2003: 25-26), Maré (2011: 
63), Vincent and Howell (2014: 75) Du Preez (2013: 40, 15), Ford (2011: 234), Gobodo-
Madikizela (2009: 151) and Park (2011: 122) note that there is an enduring gulf between the 
official rainbow nation doctrine and people’s lived realities. They then proceed to talk about 
unmet expectations and not national identity. The recurrent theme is how the legacies of 
apartheid have persisted under the new regime. The two most enduring legacies have been seen 
as the enduring influence of apartheid constructed socio-political identities and persisting 
socio-economic inequalities. 
2.4.1 South Africa as racially divided under a doctrine of non-racialism 
Non-racialism was meant to be an ideology that unites South Africans. The literature, however 
indicates that this has not been fully realised. Poplak (2014: 92) and Du Preez (2013: 253) both 
emphasise the necessity of South Africans redefining themselves and their communities. This 
view is shared by Newman and De Lannoy (2014) and Van Onselen (2015) who depict South 
Africans as being in the midst of an on-going identity crisis. Moreover, race is shown as 
remaining at the centre of these identity crises. Du Preez (2013) argues that this is because 
South Africans are still conditioned to think race matters. 
Racial consciousness is not racism in itself (Moodley and Adam, 2000: 55). The literature is 
nevertheless critical of rising ethno-racial consciousness. Moodley and Adam (2000), Kotze 
(2012: 90), Pressly (2013: 4), Newman and De Lannoy (2014) and Ford (2011) consider it to 
be divisive in South Africa. They argue that this salience of race and ethnicity balkanizes the 
South African people to the extent of compromising the vision of a united South African nation. 
For example, Newman and De Lannoy (2014) state that many older white South Africans “want 
little to do with the ‘new South Africa’”. Similarly, Ford (2011: 140) argues that many black 
South Africans are resentful that they “couldn’t terminate this war with a bullet and put the 
whites down by stamping our boots on their throats”.  
These groups may be seen as radical. However, in a discussion regarding racism in South 
Africa, Cronje (2014: 125) points out that, a third of South African adults support these radical 
– often racist – views of extremist political leaders. This indicates that race has yet to lose its 
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social salience, regardless of South Africa’s ‘unifying’ national identity that have been 
promoted since 1994. 
There are numerous works which indicate the on-going tension amongst racial groups. Many 
attributes the on-going tension to the TRC. They argue that, despite its intention, the TRC 
insufficiently addressed the trauma cause by the apartheid regime (Du Preez, 2013: 15; Foster, 
2009: 170; & Green, 2009: 75). Of all the racial groups, black South Africans have the lowest 
level of interracial trust (Gibson, 2015: 43). They also express significant more intergroup 
prejudice against other South Africans (Gibson, 2015: 43). Gibson (2015: 43) argues that this 
is undoubtable due to their experience of apartheid.  
According to Brock (2009: xv) and Volkan (2009), this has caused the trauma to be absorbed 
by the South African society and to become part of people’s group identities. The literature 
depicts this trauma as undermining South Africa. According to Volkan (2009: 16), in times of 
crisis political leaders can intuitively rekindle recollections of such trauma in order to 
consolidate the group emotionally and ideologically. Ford (2011), Du Preez (2013: 14-15) and 
Poplak (2014: 34) all agree that this on-going tension is leading to rising radical sentiment. 
This is worsened by perceptions of white South Africans not acknowledging the trauma. 
Johnson (2009: 59) and Du Preez (2013: 26) agree that whites have been lulled into a false 
sense of complacency under the Mandela years thinking that ‘race’ was now in the past. 
Vincent and Howell (2014) concur that white South Africans want a ‘post racial’ society. That 
this need, however, stems from the need to “minimize the injustices of racism and immediately 
erase the question of responsibility and ownership for the crimes of the past and the injustices 
of the present” (Vincent & Howell, 2014: 89). This sentiment seems to be shared by many 
blacks who meet this eagerness to move away from race with derision and anger, viewing the 
movement of the erasure of race as a way to protect and advance white interests (Vincent & 
Howell, 2014; Ford, 2011). 
The socio-economic legacy of apartheid is also depicted as contributing to racial tension. Kotze 
(2012), Blaser (2004), Johnson (2009: 11) and Ramutsindela (2001: 6) agree that nation-
building will only be successful if it be reinforced by concrete change. Similarly, Newman and 
De Lannoy (2014), Johnson (2009) and Van Onselen (2015) argue that South Africans consider 
the abstract ideals of the rainbow nation less important than problems regarding their lived 
realities. The majority of people remain trapped in economic subjugation and domination that 
defined the pre-1994 period (Shivambu, 2014: 1; Du Preez, 2013: 13). Until this change, the 
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equality promised by the rainbow nation narrative is presented as a luxury given to those who 
are already successful (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 62). 
Furthermore, the untransformed socio-economic environment contributes to racial tension in 
South Africa. The current environment has produced two groups: a small minority of citizens 
with good qualification and middle-income lifestyle; and the majority citizens who are 
impoverished, poorly educated and dependent on welfare (Cronje, 2014: 61). As a consequence 
of apartheid, the division is racialized with whites mostly belonging to the former group and 
blacks to the latter. Whites constitute approximately 8% of South Africans whereas about 80% 
of South Africans are black. The relative wealth of whites rankles poor blacks who have not 
found their fortunes improved post-apartheid (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 206; Shivambu, 
2014). Ford (2011), Cronje (2014: 114) and Du Preez & Rossouw (2013: 28) argue that this 
has produced a breeding ground for radical sentiment. 
The government has pursued redress to address this legacy. According to Newman and De 
Lannoy (2014: 165), many people accept redress as necessary but reject the process. This is 
true for Maré (2011), Leon (2008), Park (2011) and Du Preez (2013) who are critical of the 
narrow focus on race. The literature shows how this has been interpreted as re-racialising the 
country and in contradiction of the Rainbow Nation ideals (Ramutsindela, 2001: 33: Newman 
& De Lannoy, 2014: 163-164; Maré, 2011; Vincent & Howell, 2014: 78, 88; Sarakinsky, 
2001). Park (2011) and Du Preez (2013) caution that the racialised discourse will further 
entrench racial or other stereotypes even if its intention is to promote equality. This sentiment 
is supported by Blaser (2004), Kotze (2012) and Moodley and Adam (2000) who argue that, 
while redress is needed for nation-building, national unity will still be undermined if it cannot 
suitably balance recognition of race for redress with the discourse of non-racialism. 
However, Pressly (2013), Ramutsindela (2001) and Vincent and Howell (2014) point out that 
others see race as necessary to de-racialise South Africa, where supporters of racial redress 
argue that one cannot re-racialise what has never been de-racialised (Moodley & Adam, 2000: 
56). Hence, the response to redress is also divisive. Opinions tend to differ along racial lines 
with white people arguing for non-racialism to be prioritised and black people believing that 
race remains an essential consideration. 
Nonetheless, these tensions do not unambiguously manifest as radical thoughts. The literature 
does indicate that there are areas where non-racial identities have been pursued with varying 
levels of success. For example, reconstruction of racial relations has been identified as a 
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priority for young Afrikaners. Newman and De Lannoy (2014), Mulder (2012) and Walker 
(2005) talk about how there have been attempts within the Afrikaans community to reinvigorate 
the Afrikaans culture within the ambit of a non-racial South Africa. According to Newman and 
De Lannoy (2014: 171) they are “looking for a way of differentiating themselves from the 
racial animosity that was the hallmark of ‘their people’ in the past”. Blaser (2004) concurs and 
refers to how, despite attempts, Afrikaners have resisted ethnic mobilization. 
Moreover, Newman and De Lannoy (2014) and Pressly (2013) argue that race is becoming less 
relevant amongst certain sections of South Africans. This is specifically associated with 
individuals who have received a good education, who do not live in abject poverty and whose 
schooling environment promoted inter-racial contact. Amongst these individuals he glimpses 
the realization of the Rainbow Nation narrative where the individuals are racially aware but do 
not rely on it as their primary identity marker. Nor is race seen as divisive but the diversity ia 
appreciated (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; Pressly, 2013).  
Perversely, the responses to these pockets of non-racialism is telling in itself. According to 
Newman and De Lannoy (2014), Pressly (2013) and McKaiser (2014), black South Africans 
risk being shunned by their communities for not being ‘black’ enough. Additionally, Newman 
and De Lannoy (2014) and Walker (2005) remark that the many traditional Afrikaner 
communities remain unmotivated to adapt to post-apartheid South Africa.  
The rainbow nation was meant to promote a new and inclusive ‘we’ for post-apartheid South 
Africa. The literature, however, indicates that race remains socially relevant and salient in 
South Africa. While there has been some progress in racial relationships, the literature 
illustrates that this has had limited effect on South Africa as a whole. In general, there is still a 
great social distance among racial groups. South Africa’s traumatic past and enduring socio-
economic inequalities have made it difficult to foster social capital in South Africa. This means 
that the benefits of a collective South African identity still need be realised on a larger scale. 
2.4.2. Sentiments of who belongs in South Africa 
Non-racialism was also promoted as a way to make South Africa inclusive. The Rainbow 
Nation was meant to make South Africa a ‘home’ to all who lived in it. Race, however, is still 
influencing feelings of national belonging in South Africa even if in a different manner than 
under apartheid. Kotze (2012) and Blaser (2004) both note that a sense of belonging and 
togetherness is essential for a nation and argue that South Africans still feel excluded from the 
South African nation.  
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Moodley and Adam (2000: 55) argue that racial minorities feel alienated by the renewed 
emphasis on African values and the African-first attitude. They argue that it has left many 
minorities feeling excluded because they do not fit the definition of ‘authentic’ African 
(Moodley & Adam, 2000: 55). According to Du Preez (2013), the problem is that ‘African’ is 
being conflated with ‘black’. While he expresses empathy with the need of black Africans to 
guard their identity, he argues that this should not be treated as the only conceptualisation of 
‘African’. Moreover, there are understandings of ‘African’ that are not restricted to race. Park 
(2011) shares this sentiment. He makes the case that this narrow conceptualisation is resulting 
in continued racial exclusion. This is illustrated by the ambiguous, confused, in-between 
position of the Chinese South Africans. He considers the debate regarding the link between 
blackness and being South African to be at the core of this and other racial tension in South 
Africa (Park, 2011: 126). 
Furthermore, Thompson (2006) and Newman and De Lannoy (2014) illustrate how Afrikaans 
communities also feel alienated because of their race. Thompson (2006) describes how 
Afrikaners consider Africa their home but feel like secondary citizens because of their skin 
colour. Newman and De Lannoy (2014) agree that many whites consider South Africa their 
home. However, they also feel threatened by the black majority which have left them in a 
position where they love the country but still feel alienated within it. The issues of redress being 
attached to this issue of identity further escalates the tension regarding who is African 
(Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; Thompson, 2006; Park, 2011).  
However, as noted by Valji (2003: 1) “discriminatory attitudes and practices continue to 
manifest themselves, not just in historically familiar divisions but also in new forms of identity-
based violence”. Park (2011: 117) similarly points out how increased migration between 
regions and across national boundaries are further complicating notions of race, ethnicity, 
citizenship, identity and belonging in Africa. Hence, questions of belonging are not only in 
regards to race as the violent outbreaks of xenophobia demonstrate. 
The literature indicates how foreigners are increasingly alienated in South Africa. Many of 
them are unable to return to the country from which they came and are forced to live in a 
country in which they are unwelcome (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; Valji, 2003). Newman 
and De Lannoy (2014) attribute this to competition for resources. Valji (2003: 20, 21), 
however, argues that xenophobia is actually based on the nation-building project. The argument 
is that “in order to legitimize the fast-paced nature of the transition as well as to deal with issues 
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of reconciliation, global reintegration, and the stability of the future democracy, analysts argued 
that a national identity and affiliation needed to be forged amongst all South Africans” (Valji, 
2003: 7). The end result was focusing the national identity on forging a shared history and on 
defining more pronouncedly what or who was excluded from the nation (Valji, 2003: 20). 
Xenophobia in South Africa is described as having a racial overtone, which further shows how 
race continues to influence belonging in South Africa. Blacks are targeted for being a foreigner 
or appearing to be one. The criteria for being targeted is not based on legal status as much as 
not speaking a South African language or being ‘too dark’ (Valji, 2003: 5). The most violent 
attacks are also carried out by black South Africans. The latter’s intolerance has been attributed 
to apartheid (Valji, 2003: 4; Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 185). The rationale is that apartheid 
has installed thinking along racialized and hierarchal lines. In this regard, the xenophobic 
outbreaks are examples of the ‘us versus them’ sentiment that remains even if the target has 
shifted. 
Additionally, Spurlin (1999) discusses the status of homosexuality in South Africa. It receives 
little attention in South Africa in comparison to race. However, he makes the point that “despite 
juridical changes in the ‘new’ South Africa, the status of homosexuality remains a highly 
contested and contradictory question, and homophobia continues to function as significant 
vectors of domination” (Spurlin, 1999: 221). This, along with the works regarding xenophobia, 
illustrate the increasing complexity of nationhood in South Africa. The South African nation 
is meant to ‘belong to all who live in it’ but these questions of identity indicate that South 
Africa is still in the process of redrawing social lines to create an inclusive national identity. 
2.6 Approaches to the study of the ‘nation’ 
There is an array of approaches that have been applied to study the concept of ‘nation’.  
Sutherland (2005) uses discourse theory to study nationalism. She specifically looks at the 
‘syntax of hegemony’ (Sutherland, 2005: 186) where she gives centrality to the role of words 
and meaning as indicators of power relations. She argues that the nation as informative and 
persuasive expression of ideology can be gleaned from the style, form and content of the 
language employed (Sutherland, 2005: 197). As a way to include the concept of hegemony in 
an empirical study of nationalism, she looks at dominance in discursive spaces. She views 
dominance to be reflected where central actors “are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the 
rhetorical power of a new discourse… and this is reflected in the institutional practices of that 
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political domain; that is, the actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of a given 
discourse” (Sutherland, 2005: 196). 
Therefore, she looks at the nation via rhetorical analysis of texts (Sutherland, 2005) where all 
texts may be evaluated on the basis of how well they convince and convert. Hence, “the 
rhetorical skill displayed becomes worthy of study (Sutherland, 2005: 197). She identifies four 
main rhetorical features of a text. Firstly, the use of tropes and, secondly, the deployment of 
persuasive techniques excluding the ‘straight’ logical argument. The third feature is the unity 
of style and content. Lastly, she considers how the author’s or speaker’s reference to the real 
world filters through their imagined one. She argues that these features can be seen as ‘cues’. 
Readers use these cues to assign a particular meaning to the text. 
Sutherland (2005) shows how relevant language is in the construction of the nation and that a 
variety of texts can be examined as all texts can be instruments of persuasion. Sturm (2007) 
also looks at how signs can be used to promote a national construct. The signs he looks at are 
public monuments and not texts. He has an ethno-symbolist approach (Sturm, 2007). He argues 
that an analysis of nationalism should look into perceptions of the nation in different historical 
periods and the way in which members of a given nation develop their national sentiments. He 
shows a particular interest in how myriad groups interpret the same set of symbols, myths and 
traditions at various times (Sturm, 2007: 105). 
Both Sutherland’s (2005) and Sturm’s approaches (2007) indicate how the elites can influence 
the construction of the nation, as do the works of Moodley and Adam (2000) and Kotze (2012), 
even though they have different theoretical orientations namely modernisation and democratic 
consolidation, respectively. 
A different approach is used by this thesis to study the construction of the nation. This approach 
is based on Bacchi (2004). It is a beneficial approach given that Bacchi (2004) takes into 
consideration how a construct is both explicitly and implicitly formed. It also does not consider 
only how discourses are purposefully challenged. It can be used to demonstrate how political 
actors may inadvertently undermine the discourse that they are trying to promote, thus going 
beyond the focus of how political actors compete with one another, as well as taking into 
account how the construction of the nation may not always be what they intended. 
Putnam (2007) does not focus on the elites in society, but the connections people have to their 
fellow countrymen in the form of social capital. He specifically researches how social capital 
is affected by the increase in diversity, which most advanced societies are experiencing. 
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Diversity, Putnam (2007) found, has adverse effects on social capital. This is true in terms of 
both ‘bonding’ social capital (ties people have to others who are like them) and ‘binding’ social 
capital (ties people have to others who are unlike them). As a result, both in-group and out-
group solidarity is reduced and he finds that inhabitants of diverse communities tend to 
withdraw from collective life and less likely to trust others (Putnam, 2007: 150-151).  
His work, however, also makes the argument that these negative effects can be reduced in the 
long run by re-constructing collective social identities.  He supposes that by diverse societies 
can “create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by 
constructing new, more encompassing identities” (Putnam, 2007: 138). This paper shares this 
premise that a shared collective identity can be used to unify a diverse people. While he looks 
at the experience of increasing diversity, caused by immigration, has on advanced, his work 
can nevertheless be applied to the South African context where the end of segregationist 
policies meant that more South Africans are confronted with the ‘other’ and the social distance 
between member of the different races needs to be addressed.  
2.7 Sources which have made use of Bacchi  
Bacchi (2004) has been used in a number of sources. Several authors have cited her work to 
reference her findings. Busby and James (2015: 302) and Lewis (2006: 423) refer to Bacchi’s 
finding that policies are underpinned by certain normative assumptions. Ainsworth, Knox and 
O’Flynn (2010: 674) cite Bacchi (2004) as a cross reference with regards to the construction 
of affirmative action as preferential treatment for women in the past. Archibong and Sharps 
(2011: 39) dispute Bacchi’s assumption that people automatically link positive discrimination 
to affirmative action. Bacchi (2004) is cited as an example of a newer study of norm 
entrepreneurs and as an ideational thinker (Bacchi, 2005: 204; Bereni, 2007: 192). Sheppard 
(2012: 11) and Russel (2014) refer to Bacchi’s (2004) argument that affirmative action can be 
self-defeating depending on its conceptualisation. Lombardo, Meier and Verloo (2016: 6) and 
Matemba (2015: 72) consider Bacchi (2004) in terms of the policy-process. 
Other sources acknowledge Bacchi (2004) as a theoretical influence. Andersson and Lidestav’s 
(2016) theoretical understanding was impacted by Bacchi’s argument that affirmative action 
policies can be counter-intuitive if their designs stigmatize the target group as ‘disadvantaged’ 
while maintaining the political and social status quo. This is the case with Freidenvall and 
Hallonsten (2013) and Lewis (2006) whose thinking was influenced by Bacchi’s perspective 
that policy meanings determine policy priorities. De Beer (2015) is influenced by her 
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presentation of policy as a discourse which she considers to be apt theoretical underpinnings 
for her methodological approach. Her work is less frequently used in terms of methodology. 
Nousiainen and Pylkkänen (2013) consider Bacchi (2004) a methodological influence. They 
do a close-reading of specific policy documents and use Bacchi (2004) to support their 
approach of reading the texts as political. 
Bacchi (2004) influences Skilling (2010) more extensively. Skilling’s (2010) work also shares 
a number of similarities with mine. Both look at the political construction of national identity 
in pursuit of a specific vision. Skilling (2010: 175) describes his work as exploring the “paradox 
at the heart of national identity”. A country’s citizenship is not homogenous yet a shared 
national identity may be imposed by the government (Skilling (2010: 176). The establishment 
of a national identity is identified as the need to manage internal difference for the sake of ‘the 
nation’ as well as promoting political legitimacy and economic advantage. Internal diversity is 
acceptable as long as it falls within the ambit of the construction of the nation. South Africa 
has similarly endeavoured to pursue these goals through the establishment of a shared South 
African identity. 
Like this work, Skilling (2010) adopts Bacchi’s (2004) rationale that these constructs promote 
underlying assumptions and values. My work, however, diverges in terms of methodology. 
Skilling (2010) looks at “how [the governing party] used a construction of national identity to 
define and defend a putatively shared national purpose, naturalizing thereby certain definitions 
of policy problems and solutions” (Skilling, 2010: 175). He applies Bacchi (2004) to show that 
the national identity is constructed in a way that makes certain policies appear more desirable 
or necessary. This research looks at how problem representations influence the construction of 
the nation. What the ANC, the DA and the EFF respectively find ‘problematic’ about the 
rainbow nation was examined as well as what view of the nation they each implicitly promote 
through their distinct constructions of policy issues. It also takes into account a greater variety 
of sources. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The literature indicates how the South African nation can be viewed as a social construct but 
how the rainbow nation is not treated as construction of the nation beyond its creation. The 
rainbow nation is treated as an ideal against which to measure post-apartheid South Africa, not 
as a construction of the nation. These accounts illustrate that many South Africans are 
disappointed in post-1994 South Africa.  
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What these descriptions also indicate is that the benefits of a shared national identity have not 
yet been realised on a large scale in South Africa. To an extent this is not surprising. Putnam 
(2007) cautions that the benefits a collective identity have in terms of social capital, are only 
realised in the long run. It takes time for social lines to be shifted as to construct a new 
capacious ‘we’. The literature indicates that South Africa is still in the process of reconstructing 
divisive identities in South Africa. There has been limited success in addressing interracial 
tensions, which is worsened by enduring socio-economic inequalities. Moreover, the literature 
suggests that this slow process and the lack of nation-building in undermining the rainbow 
nation narrative is post-apartheid South Africa.  
Despite the acknowledged fragility of this civic national identity, there is not an in-depth 
consideration of current discourses regarding South Africa as a nation, which stand to challenge 
the status quo. This despite the political elite’s illustrated interest in the matter. This thesis uses 
Bacchi (2004) to examine current constructions of the nation. The literature review includes an 
overview of approaches that have been used to study the nation as a social construct and how 
Bacchi (2004) has been used by scholars. Using Bacchi (2004) to research constructions of the 
nation, is not a commonly done. the following chapter provides descriptions of the ANC, the 
DA and the EFF as political parties.  
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
34 
 
Chapter 3. Descriptions of the ANC, the DA and 
the EFF as political parties 
3.1. Introduction  
South Africa has a party system, which means that political parties are part of the political elite. 
They compete for political power and are invested in the controlling dominant discourses. Who 
they are as a political party impacts the social constructs that they create. Hence, this chapter 
provides a brief description of the ANC, the DA and the EFF.  
The chapter provides an overview of the parties’ respective histories, ideologies and positions 
in contemporary South Africa politics. It begins with the ANC, illustrating its history as South 
Africa’s liberation movement, its hybrid ideology and its post-apartheid position as the 
governing party. Secondly, the DA is discussed. The DA served as parliamentary opposition 
to the National Party, its liberal ideology and its current role as the official opposition. Lastly, 
this chapter describes the EFF, its beginning from within the ANC, its unique ideological 
combination of Marxism, Leninism and Fanonism and how it has invigorated South African 
politics with its populist style of politics.  
3.2. ANC  
3.2.1 South Africa’s national liberation movement 
The ANC was founded in 1912 making it Africa’s oldest liberation movement (De Jager, 2013: 
149). Its creation took place in the wake of the unification of South Africa (Twala, 2014: 1989; 
Brief history of the ANC, n.d; & Saunders, 2012: 434). Africans were excluded from this 
political process and only the rights of white people were acknowledged (Twala, 2014: 1989; 
Brief history of the ANC, n.d). It follows that Africans lost their lands and cattle with the 
formation of the Union of South Africa (Brief history of the ANC, n.d). They were left with 
little chance for recourse with limited options. In the past separate chiefdoms have tried to 
confront the coloniser but this facilitated Africans military defeat (Suttner, 2012: 720). Africans 
thus had to find new ways to fight for their rights and freedoms (Brief history of the ANC, n.d; 
Twala, 2014: 1989). It was argued that the best way to do so would be to unite and fight together 
(Suttner, 2012: 720; Welsh, 2011).In response to their political exclusion, traditional and 
religious leaders, professionals, people’s representatives and other prominent individuals 
gathered in Bloemfontein (Twala, 2014: 1989; De Jager, 2013: 149; Brief history of the ANC, 
n.d). Their intention was to unite a “range of scattered opposition movements to better contest 
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colonial hegemony” (Twala, 2014: 1989). Consequently, the ANC was formed to unite 
Africans and spearhead the struggle for fundamental political, social and economic change 
(What ANC, n.d). 
The ANC led the struggle and the fight against oppression in the following decades (What 
ANC, n.d). This included the organisation of mass resistance, the mobilization of the 
international community and taking up the armed struggle against apartheid (What ANC, n.d). 
The ANC is conventionally viewed as the vanguard of the struggle (Saunders, 2012: 434; 
Dubow, 2000: xiv). When the struggle moved towards negotiating a peaceful transition, they 
were one of the leading players (Ramutsindela, 2001: 3-4; Saunders, 2012: 434). With Mandela 
at the helm, the ANC became the representatives of the ‘miracle nation’ following the 
successful transition of power (Johnson, 2009: 4). 
3.2.2 An organisation with an amalgam of political ideologies 
The ANC has developed into an ideological hybrid (Rohanlall, 2014: 9). It has, throughout its 
long history, been influenced by different ideologies (Twala, 2014: 1989). As a result, the 
movement has been imbued with opposing principles and ideologies (Twala, 2014: 1989). One 
of the ANC’s greatest challenges has been balancing these internal ideological differences. In 
1955, Chief Luthuli warned that the “ANC should not dissipate its energies by indulging in 
internal ideological feuds; a fight of ‘isms’” (Twala, 2014: 1988). This has arguably become 
more difficult post-1994 without the unifying effect of the liberation struggle (De Jager, 2013: 
149). 
One of the ANC’s ideological influences is Africanism (De Jager, 2013: 149). According to 
Twala (2014: 1989), Africanism dominated from the ANC’s establishment to the 1950s. 
Membership was exclusively black throughout this period (Twala, 2014: 1989). It was argued 
that the Union represented the interests of whites and the participation of whites in the ANC’s 
struggle was limited. One of its founding ideological missions was to “unite all Africans in 
South Africa in order to challenge the racially divisive attempts by the then ruling party” 
(Twala, 2014: 1989). The focus was not to establish an inclusive democracy per se. Rather, it 
was about self-determination for the African people (Twala, 2014: 1990). Southall (2003: 255-
272) argues that the ANC fought for equality, but equality of nations rather than amongst 
individuals. Although Africanism as an ideology has varied in strength within the organisation, 
its influence has persisted. Post-1994 it has closely been associated with Thabo Mbeki and his 
presidency. 
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However, not everyone agreed with the multi-racial approach implicit in African nationalism. 
Its critics interpreted multi-racialism as implying that there were basic insuperable differences 
between the various national groups. Moreover, it supposed that these differences were so great 
that it would be best if these groups were kept separate in a type of democratic apartheid 
(Twala, 2014: 1991). Hence, they critiqued multi-racialism for attempting to “manage the 
relations among the different race groups in South Africa through what became known as 
constructive segregation” (Twala, 2014: 1990). In contrast, they promoted non-racialism. They 
argued that it will only be through the adoption of non-racialism that South African politics 
will cease to be framed in racial terms and so allow for meaningful social change and greater 
equality (Twala, 2014: 1990). Hence, the policy of non-racialism was adopted within the ANC 
(Twala, 2014:1990). 
This adoption, though, did result in ideological tension within the liberation movement. Its 
position was especially contentious with the growth of the more radical Africanist position that 
emerged in the 1940s (Twala, 2014: 1990). However, in the following decades it was non-
racialism that rose to prominence within the ANC. The Congress Alliance and the adoption of 
the Freedom Charter significantly promoted the non-racial agenda of the ANC (Twala, 2014: 
1990). The Freedom Charter emphasised cross-racial political cooperation (Twala, 2014: 
1990). Its adoption in 1955 was a pivotal moment in the narrative of the struggle exactly for its 
emphasis on non-racialism (Twala, 2014: 1990). A number of ANC members broke away as a 
result, which led to the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress. 
The Freedom Charter became one of the ANC’s official documents and played a significant 
role in the development of the ANC’s non-racial politics (Twala, 2014: 1990). Non-racialism 
has since then become deeply entrenched within the ANC. Membership of the ANC is open to 
all South Africans above the age of 18 “irrespective of race, colour and creed” (What ANC, 
n.d). Moreover, the ANC defines its key objective as the “creation of a united, non-racial, non-
sexist, and democratic society” (What ANC, n.d). The rise of non-racialism, however, has not 
erased concerns about race within the ANC.  The liberation of Africans in particular, and blacks 
in general from political and economic bondage is seen as a perquisite for a non-racial society 
(What ANC, n.d; Rohanlall, 2014: 84). 
Communism has also been one of the ANC’s major ideological influences (De Jager, 2013: 
149). The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was founded in 1921. Initially, it was 
distinct from the ANC. However, the Communist International’s interest in colonial people, 
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the ANC’s increased worker organisation and the rising ethos of non-racialism prompted the 
ANC and the CPSA to establish closer relations (Musson, 1989) to the extent that when it 
became evident that the National Party, elected into government in 1948, intended to 
criminalise communism, the CPSA willingly dissolved itself. The majority of the party felt that 
they could continue the struggle from within the ANC. Therefore, by 1950, “the parallel 
histories of nationalism and socialism had come together: the class struggle […] had merged 
with the movement for national liberation” (Saunders, 2012: 435). 
The Left’s influence on the ANC is evident in the latter’s endeavour to create a democracy 
with social content as is evident in their insistence that the South African constitution would 
include a guarantee for socio-economic rights and its initial pursuit of the collectivist-orientated 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was also indicative of its socialist 
democratic orientation (Twala, 2014: 1991-1992). However, the ANC has been criticised for 
‘talking left but walking right’ (Rohanlall, 2014: 9). According to Rohanlall (2014: 9), the ANC 
may have maintained a communist vocabulary, but in practice it adheres to liberal and capitalist 
trends. It has been criticised as neo-liberal and for its apparent alienation from workers (Twala, 
2014:1991).  
3.2.3 The ANC as governing party  
The ANC’s liberation credentials swept them into office in 1994 where they have stayed. The 
ANC has won every national election since then and has become South Africa’s political 
hegemon. They also dominate the polity and policy-making processes as a result of their 
electoral dominance (De Jager, 2013: 149). The ANC has maintained a large majority ever 
since the 1994 elections. As is evident in the table below, the ANC’s electoral support in 
national elections have always been over 60 per cent.  
Table 3.2.3. ANC national election results 
National 
election 
1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
Votes (%) 62.6 66.3 69.7 65.9 62.2 
(Results rounded up to one decimal place. Source: Election Resources, n.d.) 
Its liberation credentials, however, are a wasting asset (Johnson, 2009: 623). Increasingly, the 
ANC is being evaluated in terms of their current performance, not their struggle history. In 
terms of the former, the ANC is falling short. Leading up to the 2014 elections the media 
frequently portrayed South Africa as a nation in crisis (Poplak, 2014: ix). Reasons for this 
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portrayal include the many corruption scandals, service delivery protests, the unpopular e-toll 
system, Nkandla and Marikana (Poplak, 2014: ix; Butler, 2012: 12). Yung (2014: 141) cites 
the rise of service delivery protests and police brutality as the weakening bond between the 
people and the ANC.  
Moreover, the ANC has had difficulty with delivering its election promises (Twala, 2014: 
1991). Butler (2014) also criticises them for their failure to advance coherent and credible 
economic and development policies. These and other issues are leading to mass re-alignment 
away from the ANC (Poplak, 2014: ix). 
Additionally, citizens are increasingly critical of the ANC because they feel that the ANC has 
changed (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; McKaiser, 2014). The ANC’s political success invited 
a whole new class of patrons “anxious to befriend and subsidise ANC leaders” (Johnson, 2009: 
13). As a result, the ANC has become torn between the values of its founders and those who 
seek political power to serve political interests (De Jager, 2013: 149). In his book, McKaiser 
(2014) firstly lauds the ANC for its successes and their ideals that he feels resonates with him. 
However, he goes on to say that he, like many other South Africans, feel like they can no longer 
support the ANC - not with its endemic corruption, its lack of performance and the growing 
distance between the party and their ideals (McKaiser, 2014: 5-7). The ‘new’ ANC is also 
characterised by periods of rebellion against the leadership, and debilitating succession battles 
(Butler, 2012: 12-13). 
Furthermore, it has become distanced from its electorate. The ANC, as a mass party, has had a 
longstanding connection with the people that has been a key source of its strength and identity 
(Yung, 2014: 141). Its self-assurance that the ANC will not lose, however, has weakened this 
bond (Butler, 2014: 4-7; Yung, 2014: 141). This decline in the ANC’s hegemony and the rise 
of viable opposition has led Butler (2014: 1) to conclude that the ANC now faces 
unprecedented political challenges. A sentiment that is reinforced by Booysen (2015: 7) who 
argues that decline and decay in evident in the ANC, no matter how you look at it.  
3.3 DA 
3.3.1 History as the parliamentary opposition  
According to Leon (2008: x), “there was always a group of white South Africans who opposed 
the system of racial supremacy and tyranny of its oppression and held fast for a more just and 
humane political and economic order”. They, however, fought apartheid from within the 
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system as parliamentary opposition to the National Party. In 1959 the Progressive Party was 
formed by a faction of the United Party. These members broke away when the United Party 
voted against returning land to the black majority (Why the DA, n.d). The party was opposed 
to apartheid and sought constitutional reform. In 1961, the party won only one seat in the 
elections. This seat was held by Helen Suzman who continued to stand against racial 
discrimination and remains known as a prominent anti-apartheid activist (Why the DA, n.d). 
In 1974 the Progressive Party merged with the Reform Party to establish the Progressive 
Reform Party. In 1977, the PRF combined with the Committee for a United Opposition to form 
the Progressive Federal Party and became the official opposition (Why the DA, n.d). When the 
tricameral constitution was introduced, the PRF strongly opposed it given its exclusion of black 
people (Why the DA, n.d). In 1989, the Independent Party, the National Democratic Movement 
and Progressive Federal Party joined to form the Democratic Party, which is the predecessor 
of the DA (Why the DA, n.d; De Jager, 2013: 165). Hence, the DA considers itself the result 
of several movements and parties that united over the year under the vision of a liberal 
democracy (Why the DA, n.d). 
Fighting within the system of apartheid, however, meant that up to 1994 none of their black 
members could become public representatives. This has contributed to the DA’s reputation of 
being a ‘white’ party (De Jager, 2013: 165). The DA’s opposition frequently use raced arsenals 
to undermine the credibility of this historically white party with its roots in apartheid 
parliamentary politics (Villa-Vicencio & Soko, 2012: 77). Deserved or not, the DA carries 
apartheid baggage (Pressly, 2013: 162). In response, the ‘Know Your DA’ campaign was 
launched to highlight its liberal roots and its anti-apartheid activists (Pressly, 2013; McKaiser, 
2014). It has, nevertheless, retained its stigma as a white party.  
3.3.2 The DA’s liberal ideology 
The DA is and has always been a liberal party. As with other liberal parties, the DA’s priority 
is the individual (Leon, 2008:623). They envision a society where a person’s success is 
determined by their efforts and not by accident of birth (DA, 2016: 10; Leon, 2008: 276). 
Hence, it cannot be a society based on unfair discrimination. All individuals must enjoy equal 
rights and access to opportunities irrespective of gender, ethnicity or race (DA, 2014: 8). Their 
freedom must also be protected. They believe in constitutional supremacy on the basis that “the 
state has no right to tell people how to think and what they may or may not say” (DA, 2014: 
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8). According to the DA (2014: 8), individuals should be free to do what they want as long as 
they do not infringe on the rights of others (DA, 2014: 8).  
Therefore, the DA believes in limited state intervention. Ideally the state’s role is to create an 
opportunity society “where every individual has the power to live a life he or she values” (DA, 
2014: 8). The state must provide these opportunities by growing the economy and stimulating 
job growth to lift people out of poverty (DA, 2014: 8). However, they should also provide a 
social safety net to protect vulnerable citizens (DA, 2014: 8). According to James (2013),  
“never has liberalism’s balance between individual freedom and the power 
of the state to champion social responsibility and opportunity through 
taxation, welfare and public services been so widely understood as it is in 
today’s complex world”. 
One of the complexities that South African liberalism has had to adapt to was the legacy of 
apartheid. James (2013) explains that South Africa is a broken society with numerous 
contradictions. As a result, it has been challenging at times to translate liberal theory into 
practice. For example, the DA has had to question how to balance a policy of non-racialism 
with strategic interventions to counter apartheid’s legacy (James, 2013).  
Liberals are divided about the extent of the role of the state in the economy (James, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the DA has come to the conclusion that action must be taken to “achieve genuine 
redress for the social and economic legacy of Apartheid” (DA, 2014: 8). According to the DA 
(2016: 10), an equal and fair society will only be possible if the large-scale inequality left in 
apartheid’s wake is addressed. A level playing field must be created for all South Africans 
(DA, 2016: 10). Hence, the DA is committed to both restorative and distributive justice (James, 
2013). Their resultant policies are not being guided by race per se but by the need to benefit 
the least advantaged the most (James, 2013).  
3.3.3 The DA as the official opposition 
The DA has since then grown significantly and consistently. In the table below, this increase 
in their share of the national vote can be tracked. It has grown from 1.7 per cent in the 1994 
election, to 22.2 per cent in the 2014 national election.  
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Table 3.3.3. DA national election results 
National 
election 
1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
Votes (%) 1.7 9.6 12.4 16.7 22.2 
(Results rounded up to one decimal place. Sources: Election Resources, n.d.) 
Part of their growth can be attributed to the rise in anti-ANC sentiment. Descendants of the 
struggle generation have less of an emotional attachment to the ANC (Pressly, 2013: 10; 
Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 205). They attribute less to the struggle and focus on the 
contemporary situation like the significant backlog in service delivery, the corruption and 
unanswered hopes (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 205). These critiques against the ANC have 
led many to believe that for the dominant party’s power to be constrained, they need to face 
credible opposition (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014:211). This has provided the DA with the 
opportunity to present themselves as a viable alternative (McKaiser, 2014: 13; Pressly, 2013: 
32). 
The DA has capitalised on this opportunity. They use anti-ANC sentiment to rally people of 
all races to their cause (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 203). According to the DA (2016: 1), 
people can continue to support the ANC and support the status quo of “corruption, empty and 
broken promises, poor service delivery and high unemployment”. Or they can vote for the DA 
and consequently bring about radical change in government (DA, 2016: 1). The DA depicts 
themselves as the “only viable alternative to the ANC” (Why the DA, n.d). 
According to McKaiser (2014: 9-12), the DA is the obvious choice, at least on a superficial 
level, for an alternative given their good governance and service delivery. The DA’s apparent 
strategy has been to “win local, govern well and aim for national” (De Jager, 2013: 165). It has 
been relatively successful where it governs which has allowed the DA to style themselves as 
the government that delivers (De Jager, 2013: 165; Why the DA, n.d). Regardless, McKaiser 
(2014) argues that the DA will go no further unless they diversify their support base, especially 
amongst the black poor. Hence, Zille’s willingness to step back and Maimane’s ascendency. 
3.3 EFF 
3.3.1 The on-going struggle against racialised capitalism 
The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was founded in July 2013. However, they see their 
struggle as originating from the arrival of Jan van Riebeck (Shivambu, 2014: iix; EFF, 2013: 
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1). According to the EFF (2013: 1), his arrival begun the racist colonial and imperialist, 
political, economic and social domination of the Khoi and San people of South Africa. This 
domination sparked the resistance of which the EFF considers itself a part (EFF, 2013: 1). 
While the EFF (2013: 1) acknowledges that Africans had their temporary victories, they 
conclude that they were ultimately defeated, humiliated and enslaved by colonial settlers (EFF, 
2013: 1). 
A key victory in the resistance was the political freedoms symbolically gained in 1994 (EFF, 
2013: 2; Shivambu, 2014: 1). This, at least, marked the end of the legalistic form of “colonial-
apartheid domination” (EFF, 2013: 2). However, the EFF (2013: 2) argues that the post-1994 
government was given the “overwhelming mandate to turn political power into total economic 
emancipation”. Political power in itself was never enough. It would only ever be meaningful 
where it was backed by economic freedom (EFF, 2013: 6; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a). 
They argue that the new political freedoms have not been translated into economic 
emancipation (EFF, 2013: 2, 3; Shivambu, 2014: 106). Consequently, the black majority 
remains conquered and powerless (EFF, 2013: 2; Shivambu, 2014: 1). 
Therefore, the EFF sees themselves as continuing the struggle against imperialism, capitalism 
and racism (Shivambu, 2014: 1). They initially pursued the struggle from within the ANC. The 
founder and commander in chief of the EFF, Malema, gained his national political reputation 
as president of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL). Malema rose rapidly 
within the ANC ranks. However, a rift formed between Malema’s faction and the ANC’s 
mother-body.  
According to Shivambu (2014), this rift was formed because of Malema and his allies’ insistent 
push for nationalisation. He argues that the ANC turned on them because Malema’s faction 
had realized that the ANC government was directionless and that their faction had vowed to 
stand against corruption, money laundering and fraud and rejected Jacob Zuma who was at the 
head of what they saw as a failing state (Shivambu, 2014: 21). This, despite Malema’s role in 
installing Zuma as leader of the ANC (Ford, 2011).  
Ford (2011) provides a different interpretation for this rift. According to Ford (2011), ANC 
leaders lost patience for Malema’s outrageous tactics. She also adds that his rapid rise within 
the ranks of the ANC alarmed several older cadres. Senior ANC members who have been 
working their way up within the ANC, felt threatened (Ford, 2011). Either way, disciplinary 
action was brought against Malema. This culminated in his eventual expulsion from the ANC.  
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In response Malema and his allies called for a people’s conference. They sent for delegates 
from across the country to gather in Soweto on 26 and 27 June. They gathered as:  
“Economic Freedom Fighters, representing non-government organizations, youth, 
workers, traditional leaders, Activists, Movements, Non-Profit organisations, political 
parties, churches, intellectuals, academics, Students, Traditional Chiefs, Headmen and 
Kings, Independent Councillors, Internationalists and many others who have responded 
to the clarion call” (EFF, 2013a). 
The purpose of the conference was to resolve the question of ‘what is to be done’ (EFF, 2013a). 
According to the Economic Freedom Fighters (2015), the question became necessary because 
the former liberation movement had failed to deliver on their ideological, political and 
historical mandate “to totally emancipate South Africa from starvation, unemployment, 
poverty, inequalities, hopelessness and potential social instability”.   
Moreover, the EFF does not believe that the ANC can still carry out this mandate (EFF, 2013: 
2; Mbete, 2014: 39). Its members have become too corrupted by power and the related sins of 
the incumbency (EFF, 2013: 2). As a result, they have lost the capacity to understand the 
aspirations of the people. The EFF point to the deepening neglect and violence against the 
people, which ranges from the brazen abuse of power to the sheer disregard of the people’s 
voice (EFF, 2013: 2). They (the ANC) are turning South Africa into a kleptocracy with those 
connected to political leaders becoming richer and more corrupt (EFF, 2013: 6).   
Additionally, the EFF came to the conclusion that there was no-one available to pursue the 
mandate of economic freedom. According to the EFF (2013: 5), progressive forces within the 
ANC and the youth movement have been suppressed. Nor is there any real ideological 
opposition to the ANC. They argue that opposition political parties ultimately share the ANC’s 
neo-liberal, capitalist and free-market programme (EFF, 2013: 5). These parties oppose the 
incumbent government only on superficial issues. Furthermore, they consider the left-wing 
formations aligned with the ANC and the trade union movement to have also been swallowed 
by reform politics (EFF, 2013: 5). Consequently, these organisations cannot be relied on to 
challenge the ANC’s ideology (EFF, 2013: 5). 
Hence, the EFF has taken it upon themselves to provide an alternative to the so-called current 
neo-colonial system (EFF, 2013a). They considered three options regarding how they should 
proceed with their resistance (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a). They could act within the 
ANC to advocate for radical change with the hope that they will eventually self-correct to save 
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society from starvation and the declining living conditions of the people (Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2015a). Or they could act as a movement advocating for economic freedom while 
remaining unaligned to an electoral political party and not contest elections (Economic 
Freedom Fighters, 2015a). Or, finally, they could become a political party and so compete 
against the ANC (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b). 
Given the importance of elections in South Africa, the EFF styled themselves as a political 
party to compete in them (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b). Their intention is to pursue 
economic emancipation through political power (EFF, 2013: 7; Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2015a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d). They became what they consider to be is South 
Africa’s only political party actively pursuing socialism (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; 
Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b). 
If so, the EFF presents a unique brand of socialism. They are controversially rich socialists 
(Ford, 2011). Poplak (2014: 40) consequently finds the EFF’s attacks on commercialism and 
capitalism to be ironic given how ‘well-versed’ they are in those benefits. Ford (2011) argues 
that Malema and his like has always been concerned with material benefits despite their pro-
poor rhetoric. Malema has defended his extravagant lifestyle by arguing that he wants to show 
blacks that they too are worthy of wealth (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009) 
3.3.2 A unique ideological combination of Marxism, Leninism and Fanonism 
The EFF looks at the past and present with a unique ideological lens (Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2015b). They draw inspiration from the broad Marxist-Leninist tradition and Fanonist 
schools of thought (EFF, 2013: 6; Shivambu, 2014:77-80). They view capitalism through a 
Marxist-Leninist lens and agree that its inevitable result is a class struggle (Shivambu, 
2014:77). Moreover, they see capitalism as the core of South Africa’s problems and stalwartly 
define themselves as anti-capitalist (Shivambu, 2014: 95; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; 
EFF, 2013a). They are very critical of the government’s commitment to neoliberalism (EFF, 
2013: 3). According to them, the current economic policies empower a few corporations and 
individuals at the cost of communities (EFF, 2013: 3). It has also contributed to poor service 
delivery, the draining of state resources and South Africa remaining a consumer of finished 
goods and services (EFF, 2013: 3). 
While the EFF defines themselves as socialists, they are critical of the Eurocentrism and the 
Western arrogance they see defining socialism and the world. To counter-act this bias the EFF 
gives equal credence to the work of Fanon (Shivambu, 2014: 78). They draw on Fanon’s 
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argument that the economic substructure is also a superstructure in former colonies (Shivambu, 
2014: 78). In these instances: “the cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, 
you are white because you rich” (Shivambu, 2014: 78). This perspective, however, does not 
explain wealthy black individuals. Black billionaires like Patrice Motsepe and Cyril 
Ramaphosa are discarded on the basis of being white ‘agents’ (Poplak, 2014: 43).  
According to the EFF (2013: 2), this has been and remains the status quo in South Africa. 
Capitalism in South Africa has always been underlined by racism, segregation and sexism 
(EFF, 2013: 2). Shivambu (2014: 91) argues that under apartheid racial and class exploitation 
were inseparable. It resulted in a racialised capitalism that places the black majority, 
particularly Africans, at the lower end of society (EFF, 2013: 22). Moreover, South Africa’s 
current system of accumulation has retained its colonial nature (Shivambu, 2014: 88).  
Therefore, the EFF has responded by creating a racialised socialism. They style themselves as 
the vanguard of the working-class revolution (Shivambu, 2014: 11). Their struggle is beyond 
any single political party and inclusive of anyone who identifies with it (Shivambu, 2014: 5). 
Additionally, they make the case for intra-racial equality and do not exclude whites from the 
dream of economic emancipation (Shivambu, 2014: 4). However, the EFF remembers that 
blacks were previously oppressed and whites turned a blind eye to that (Shivambu, 2014: 8-9). 
This in turn has justified its prioritisation of the black people in the post-apartheid era.  
3.3.3. Adhering to a controversial style of politics 
Despite their youth, the EFF rapidly ensnared the public imagination (Mbete, 2014: 35). This 
is reflected in their electoral success. The EFF gained 6.4% of the national vote in 2014 despite 
having only been launched in 2013 (Electoral Commission of South Africa, n.d). Making it the 
third largest political party in South Africa a year after its formation. Their popularity can be 
attributed to their ability to excite and invigorate the political scene (Poplak, 2014: 166). This 
is attributed to the EFF’s populist political style, which is characterised by its appeal to the 
people, its use of crisis, breakdown and threat and by its bad manners (Mbete, 2014).  
Populist movements depict themselves as defending ‘the pure people’ against ‘the corrupt elite’ 
(Mbete, 2014: 38). According to the EFF, the ‘people’ refers to “the poor, marginalised masses 
of South Africa” (Mbete, 2014: 38). The EFF in turn defends them from those who hold 
political power (Mbete, 2014: 38). White people and the ANC are invariably described as 
antagonists to the people (Ford, 2011; Mbete, 2014: 38; Poplak, 2014: 40, 43).  
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Secondly, populist politics use crisis, break down and threat as driving forces (Mbete, 2014: 
38). Incidents are framed as emergencies, which will allow immediate and decisive action that 
is favoured by populists (Mbete, 2014: 38). According to Mbete (2014: 38), the EFF was 
formed out of a crisis. Its existence due to the expulsion of Malema and Floyd Shivambu from 
the ANC (Ford, 2011; Mbete, 2014: 38). They also frame incidents in a manner that depict 
them, and through them the poor, as being under attack. For example, the tax evasion case 
against Malema was depicted as an attempt of the ANC to remove Malema as a political 
opponent (Poplak, 2014: 39-40; Ford, 2011).  
Lastly, the EFF’s political style is characterised as populist by its ‘bad manners’. Mbete (2014: 
38) states that populist discourse is course and marked by their disregard for what is 
appropriate. In challenging the rules and conventions of politics and political institutions, 
populists distance themselves from the elite. This is evident in the ‘revolutionary’ dress code 
of the EFF, which they use as a way to show their solidarity with the people (Mbete, 2014: 39; 
Poplak, 2014: 25). The EFF’s ‘bad manners’ are also evident in their blatant disdain for 
parliamentary rules and their more unconventional forms of politicking such as protests 
(Mbete, 2014: 43). Poplak (2014: 89) describes their tactics as a combination of “standard 
gangster activities – drugs, maiming, leaning against cars – with political campaigning”. 
It is exactly this ‘hooliganism’ that makes the EFF appeals to some people (Ford, 2011; Du 
Preez & Rossouw (2009: 28). For black youths “[he] has become a much-admired hero [with] 
his arrogant, crude defiance of their fears, resentments and aspirations” (Du Preez & Rossouw, 
2009: 6). He has put into words the racial and social anger that continues to bubble beneath the 
surface of society and he hits raw nerves and earns kudos for it in many quarters (Ford, 2011: 
15). According to Ford (2011: ix), Malema  
“fills the gaps of disappointment and failure at a time when the promise of 
liberation had become privatized and the ideal of reciprocity and mutuality 
enshrined in the Constitution are struggling to find political and cultural 
platforms”.  
Hence, there are many people who relate to his, and the EFF’s, style of politics; even as others 
hate him for upsetting the status quo. He challenged the notion of the Rainbow Nation and 
reminded them that the struggle was not over yet (Ford, 2011). Many people resented him for 
it. People from all sides were concerned that he was provoking a conflict that “could erupt in 
bloodshed similar to that of the years before the 1994 election” (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009: 
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16). This has led Malema to be both one of the most influential and ridiculed politicians in 
South Africa (Du Preez, 2013: 5). 
According to Mbete (2014: 36), the context created by socio-economic hardships makes the 
EFF’s style of politics particularly appealing to people even if it can be seen as lacking in 
content. Poplak (2014: 38) comes to a similar conclusion. He argues that it would be foolish to 
disregard the EFF as a serious threat to the ANC and DA, especially in downtrodden 
communities. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter described the respective histories, ideologies and political positions of the ANC, 
the DA and the EFF. These parties have different ideological orientations that are reflective of 
their different origins. The ANC as a mass-movement has incorporated various ideological 
influences over time. Consequently, it has a hybrid ideology that contains features of 
Africanism, non-racialism and communism. In contrast, the DA is a liberal party. It traces its 
history through a number of parties and movements that were centred on the liberal vision of a 
non-racial constitutional democracy with limited state responsibility to the individual. The EFF 
is one of South Africa’s youngest political parties but considers itself as part of the struggle 
against colonialism, imperialism and racialism. They use their Marxist-Leninist-Fanonist 
ideology to explain how South Africa has retained its colonial characteristics. The expectation 
would be that these differences would be reflected in any discourse that they promote.  
Moreover, the parties’ positions in current South African politics were described. The ANC 
has been South Africa’s political hegemon since 1994. However, its electoral dominance has 
been in decline. Citizens have become increasingly critical of the ANC. As a result, South 
African politics are becoming increasingly competitive. The DA has been growing steadily as 
the official opposition, while the EFF’s rapid rise in popularity belies its young age. The decline 
in the ANC’s hegemony is providing the EFF and the DA with greater access to discursive 
spaces. In the following chapter, the constructions of the nations that the parties respectively 
promote are examined.  
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Chapter 4: Political parties’ constructions of South 
Africa as a nation  
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines ANC’s, the DA’s and the EFF’s respective constructions of South 
Africa as nation. The point of departure is how the parties respectively relate to the Rainbow 
Nation. This will be evident in how they regard the symbols of the nations. For example, how 
they respond to the ‘rainbow nation’ term. Whether or not the party supports the characteristics 
of inclusivity, diversity and equality which is characterises this view of the nation. Also, how 
they regard reconciliation and Mandela respectively. Reconciliation because it has been 
interpreted as essential for the rainbow nation. That this vision of the nation can only be realised 
if races can resolve the animosity between them and come together. While Archbishop Tutu is 
the one who coined the term, it was furthered by Nelson Mandela as the first democratically 
elected president of South Africa (Buqa, 2015: 1). Hence, he is frequently as the symbolic 
figurehead of post-apartheid South Africa, including the view of South Africa as the rainbow 
nation. 
Additionally, the respective parties depict policy issues as problems are considered. These 
problem representations are researched by regarding what is presented as the problem and 
viewed as a solution. This is done as a means to investigate what assumptions are contained 
within these constructions of problems. These assumptions also reflect how the parties 
respectively view the South African nation. Moreover, how this underlying assumption relates 
to its more explicit view of the rainbow nation.  
4.2. ANC  
4.2.1 Continued commitment to the rainbow nation 
The ANC does not consider the rainbow nation as problematic. On the contrary, they still apply 
the moniker to the contemporary South African nation (ANC, 2013-2016). They also regard 
Mandela as the ‘father’ of the nation (ANC, 2013-2016). They also explicitly ascribe the values 
of non-discrimination and reconciliation to him (ANC, 2013-2016). 
Moreover, the ANC describes an on-going commitment to these values. They emphasise the 
relationship between Mandela and the ANC. On the one hand, they dedicate themselves to the 
values associated with Mandela. They argue that his values have been inculcated in the 
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organisation (ANC, 2013-2016). They repeatedly vow to take forward his legacy (ANC, 2013-
2016). On the other hand, they go to lengths to illustrate the influence the ANC had on Mandela. 
They argue that, while he became representative of the ‘new’ South Africa, he was nevertheless 
acting as a member of the ANC (ANC, 2013-2016) and that in his actions and beliefs he was 
adhering to the party’s doctrine. He is described as the product of the ANC (ANC, 2013-2016). 
Consequently, they are therefore critical of parties who try to ‘appropriate’ Mandela (ANC, 
2013-2016). 
Their language use also indicates that they do not believe that they have wavered from the 
ideals Mandela promoted in 1994. They talk about how Nelson Mandela “remains [their] 
symbol of a flagship bearer of a better society” (ANC, 2013-2016). That he continues to be 
their inspiration and that they will continue building the South African society that he 
envisioned (ANC, 2013-2016). They are not committing to his values; they are recommitting 
to them (Kodwa, 2015; ANC, 2013-2016). Hence, they present the ANC as being consistently 
committed to the values which informed the creation of the Rainbow Nation in 1994.  
The ANC implicitly show their support for South Africa as a civic nation through its positive 
endorsement of its symbols. For example, the moniker ‘Rainbow Nation’ which is associated 
with the 1994 national identity as well as Mandela. Given that he has become symbolic of that 
national identity, which is reinforced by their view that ‘his’ values are non-discrimination and 
reconciliation. Both of these are related to South Africa as a civic nation. 
Moreover, the political party show their support for the characteristics that the Rainbow Nation 
was supposed to promote as civic nation. They argue for a single, united South African nation 
(ANC, 2013-2016). This nation, they argue, should go across divisions (My ANC, 2014e; 
ANC, 2012: 5). They set this out in their party constitution where they describe the 
establishment of a nation built on common patriotism and loyalty that will unite people of all 
types as one of the party’s aims (ANC, 2012:5). This is a vision that is re-affirmed in both their 
national and local election manifestos (ANC, 2014: 50; ANC, 2016: 5), as well as on YouTube, 
where they argue that the ANC is “building a common identity [which] embrace[s] our 
diversity’, a common nation that is not defined by ‘colour, race, class, or creed” (My ANC, 
2014c). They do not see South Africa’s heterogeneity as obstructive to national identity. 
Instead, they regard the South African nation as being stronger for its diversity (ANC, 2013-
2016; My ANC, 2014c; My ANC, 2013e).  
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Clearly the ANC sees the South African nation as inclusive. It is a stance that is supported by 
their recurrent statement that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it” (ANC, 2013-2016; 
ANC, 2012: 30; ANC, 2016: 5; Mthembu, 2013; Zuma, 2015b). Similarly, they argue that “if 
SA is indeed to move forward, all South Africans, regardless of language or background, need 
to work together as equal citizens”. This is illustrative of another key characteristic that the 
Rainbow Nation intended to promote as part the South African national identity: equality. 
One of the ways in which the Rainbow Nation tried to establish equality as a new basis for the 
South African nation was through reconciliation. Reconciliation was seen as a way to address 
the racial tensions that resulted from apartheid’s system of competing nationalisms. It 
endeavoured to put these tensions to rest in favour of a united South African nation. The ANC 
maintains this stance. It argues for the continued necessity and value of reconciliation (Zuma, 
2014f; Zuma, 2013g; ANC, 2013-2016). The political party lauds “SA's remarkable ability to 
put centuries of racial hatred behind it in favour of reconciliation” (ANC, 2013-2016).  
They reinforce this stance by showing the ANC as embracing white people in the new South 
Africa. It was the white race that caused the oppression the ANC fought to overthrow. Yet the 
ANC shows that they will nevertheless be equal citizens in post-apartheid South Africa. This 
is evident in Zuma’s (ANC, 2013-2016) rejection that they wish to expel Afrikaners from South 
Africa. It is also implicitly supported in their electoral videos where they depict South Africans 
as being members of all races, including whites, and co-existing in harmony under the ‘new’ 
South Africa (My ANC, 2016c; My ANC, 2016b; My ANC, 2014a). Similarly, they use Twitter 
to tweet images of white South Africans as part of their support base (ANC, 2013-2016).  
Moreover, the ANC supports non-racialism as a South African ideal.  They see it as an essential 
characteristic of post-apartheid South Africa (ANC, 2013-2016). One of the ANC’s 
fundamental goals is the construction of a “united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and 
prosperous society in South Africa” (ANC, 2012: 2, 5; Mthembu, 2013; Zuma, 2013b; Zuma, 
2015c; Zuma, 2015d). They envision a South Africa where all citizens will be measured by 
their humanity regardless of race (ANC, 2013-2016). 
According to the ANC, they have been unwavering in their commitment to non-racialism. They 
see their stance as preceding the ‘new’ South Africa (Zuma, 2016b; ANC, 2013-2016). 
Moreover, they describe non-racialism and unity being the cornerstone of the ANC even before 
its formal establishment in 1912 (ANC, 2013-2016). Their language use also indicates that they 
have been consistently committed to non-racialism. They talk about how they will continue 
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working to bring about a non-racial South Africa (ANC, 2013-2016). Similarly, the 
commitments made to non-racialism are about reaffirming their stance (ANC, 2013-2016). It 
should, however, be noted that this view does not take the ANC’s history of ideological 
heterogeneity into account, as illustrated in chapter four.  
Moreover, their promotion of non-racialism is complemented by their rejection of racism. 
Under apartheid racism was entrenched and was the basis of unfair discrimination. It also 
contributed to antagonistic relationships among South Africa’s racial nations. Thus, racism is 
a specific obstacle to South Africa as an inclusive and egalitarian nation. Its rejection, therefore, 
is essential in the pursuit of civic nationalism. The ANC is fervent in their condemnation of 
racism. It is described as ‘unpalatable’ (ANC, 2013-2016) as well as a foul and undesirable 
feature that dehumanises both victim and practitioner (ANC, 2013-2016). Hence, they mobilise 
South Africans to band together and mobilise against racism (ANC, 2013-2016). According to 
Zuma (2015a; 2016b), the ANC rejects racism and all related intolerances. 
The ANC specifically tries to distance racism from post-apartheid South Africa. They describe 
the post-apartheid nation as a place where races work together in solidarity with one another 
(Kodwa, 2016b; ANC, 2013-2016). They explicitly state that “[there is] No place [for] racism 
and ethnicity in this country” (ANC, 2013-2016). They call upon South Africans to act as a 
nation to reject racism to make way for a non-racial South Africa (ANC, 2013-2016). Where 
incidents of racism are discussed, their descriptions make it evident that these are not the 
actions of South Africans. They isolate racism to a ‘tiny minority’ or individuals whose 
attitudes should not be seen as a reflection of the views of the majority of South Africans (ANC, 
2013-2016; Kodwa, 2016a). Hence, the ANC argues that while there are racists in South Africa, 
South Africa as nation is not racist (ANC, 2013-2016; Kodwa, 2016a). This further illustrates 
how the ANC continues to view South Africa as the Rainbow Nation.    
4.1.2 South Africa as two racial nations 
According to the ANC, radical economic transformation is one of the political party’s top 
priorities. In the 2014 national elections it was considered as the ‘central question’ (ANC, 2014: 
3; ANC, 2013-2016). Mthembu (2014), Kodwa (2014b; 2014d; 2014p) and Mantashe (2014) 
all affirm that the ANC considers transformation as essential for South Africa. Moreover, they 
frequently tweet statements indicating the ANC’s continued dedication to the pursuit of 
economic transformation (ANC, 2013-2016).  
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The ANC pursues economic transformation because they believe that it is the solution to South 
Africa’s socio-economic challenges. According to Zuma (2014a), the “ANC must now 
implement radical socio-economic transformation to meaningfully address this triple 
challenge”. Similarly, their national election manifesto states that “Our struggle has now 
reached the second, in which we will implement radical socio-economic transformation to 
meaningfully address poverty, unemployment and inequality” (ANC, 2014: 3). Mantashe also 
considers that “the pace of socio-economic transformation will determine the pace of solving 
the poverty & unemployment related conflict” (ANC, 2013-2016). 
Their call for ‘radical economic transformation’ indicates that they believe that the economy 
has not undergone sufficient changes. While South Africa may have experienced a political 
transition, these differences have not been reflected in the structure of the economy. They do 
not explicitly express it as such given that they do not conceptualise ‘radical economic 
transformation’. It can, however, be deduced from the policies they promote. These policies 
indicate how they are practically pursuing economic transformation via inclusive growth and 
affirmative action. 
Inclusive growth and affirmative action are linked to the goal of radical economic 
transformation. The ANC argues that inclusive growth is needed to “substantially reduce 
poverty and unemployment, and place the economy on a qualitatively different growth path” 
(ANC, 2014: 18). It is seen as a way to address South Africa’s triple challenge (My ANC, 
2015v). The shared goals implicitly link it to the ANC’s overall pursuit of economic 
transformation. This connection is made explicit where the ANC describes inclusive growth as 
being at the core of the political party’s economic mandate, which is to transform the economy 
(ANC, 2013-2016). Black economic empowerment is also described as a means to address 
South Africa’s triple economic challenge (Zuma, 2014c). Zuma (2014f) also directly depicts 
broad-based BEE as a means to transform the structure of the economy. 
The ANC’s proposed solutions suggest that South Africa’s economic challenges should not 
only be addressed, but that they should also be solved in a way that empowers black people. 
Inclusive growth is described as a means to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are 
equitably shared amongst all South Africans (ANC, 2013-2016). According to Ramaphosa, 
this will also entail greater diversity in the economy “both in terms of what we produce and in 
terms of who owns, manages & work in it” (ANC, 2013-2016). Zuma (2014a, 2014b) also 
argues that an inclusive economy would be more reflective of the country’s demographics as 
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it would “change the ownership, control and management of the economy” (Zuma, 2014b). 
These elaborations do not directly refer to the need to include black people. However, given 
that they consider the economy as ‘untransformed’, the orientation around black peoples are 
tacitly included.  
The intention of inclusive growth is to ensure the economic participation and ownership of 
black South Africans is also explicitly expressed. In terms of inclusive growth, the ANC argues 
that there is a “need to undo the deliberate exclusion of black people… from meaningful 
participation in the mainstream of the economy” (ANC, 2013-2016). Similarly, Zuma (2013b) 
argues that the economy should be grown in such a manner as to “[empower] the historically 
oppressed Africans and the working class in particular”. The argument that the ANC makes is 
that the economy will only transformed once black people, Africans in particular, play a larger 
role in the economy (My ANC, 2014e; My ANC, 2015a). Moreover, the conceptualisation of 
affirmative action as BEE illustrates a similar intention as regards to the policy. BEE is 
specifically meant to economically empower black people. 
Thus, the ANC’s solutions indicate that the political party considers South Africa’s economic 
challenges to be problematic specifically in terms of race. This is reinforced in how they frame 
South Africa’s triple challenge in terms of race. For example, Zuma (2013d) measures the state 
of the economy in terms of the gap between white and black people. Similarly, unemployment 
is framed as a problem in the sense that it has a greater effect on black people than on the white 
population (ANC, 2013-2016). Ownership in the economy is also criticised in terms of the on-
going racial discrepancy (ANC, 2013-2016). 
Hence, the ANC sets out to correct the racial patterns in the economy when they talk about 
radical economic transformation. The racial pattern of the economy is at the core of the ANC’s 
problem representation. They specifically find it problematic that they are similar to how they 
were under apartheid. According to Zuma (2015d), “it cannot be correct that, twenty-one years 
after democracy, the apartheid ownership patterns continue unabated”. The ANC wants to 
change the ownership of the South African economy (My ANC, 2016a; My ANC, 2015b; 
ANC, 2013-2016). Mantashe (2015) argues that it is expected of them to take race into account 
when dealing with poverty, inequality and unemployment. Additionally, they explicitly state 
that they need to ‘de-racialise’ the economy (Zuma, 2015e; My ANC, 2016a; Kodwa, 2014a; 
ANC, 2013-2016). 
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The ANC, however, does not consider itself as motivated by ethnic nationalism, regardless of 
their racial framing. Their intention is to address the socio-economic legacy of apartheid. Zuma 
(2016a) argues that without transforming the economy, the inequality created by apartheid will 
be reproduced and further entrench racial divisions. South Africa’s triple challenge is described 
as part of apartheid’s legacy (My ANC, 2016a; My ANC, 2015c; My ANC, 2014d; My ANC 
2014b; ANC, 2012:2, 5; ANC, 2014: 13; Kodwa, 2014b; Mthembu, 2014; ANC, 2013-2016). 
Hence, their redress is racial where they describe their motivation as the need to ‘unshackle’ 
black South Africans from their past of economic exclusion and exploitation (Zuma, 2016a; 
ANC, 2014:3). If they do not, they see the transition from apartheid as incomplete (Zuma, 
2014b; 2014f). Hence, their problem representation comes from the need to rectify the past by 
ensuring the economic inclusion of those who have been historically excluded and oppressed 
such as black people (ANC, 2014: 3; Zuma, 2013a; 2014d).  
However, they see themselves as acting in favour of the civic nation. Despite their racial 
presentation of the problem and solution, they are not motivated by ethnic nationalism per se. 
They work from the assumption that racism is structural and that the untransformed economy 
remains racist (ANC, 2013-2016). According to Zuma (2014c), equality will only be realised 
once the structure of the society which was designed to favour the minority, is transformed. 
Their structural view of racism means that they consider it imperative that blacks are 
economically empowered otherwise a civic nation in South Africa will not be possible. Hence, 
affirmative action is not to benefit black people, but to benefit the South African nation. It is 
not a reflection of who is included or excluded from the nation, but a pragmatic consideration. 
They therefore consider it the duties of South Africans to support this endeavour regardless of 
race (ANC, 2013-2016; Mkhize, 2014). It is not meant to continue racial antagonisms but 
soothe them. According to Zuma (2014d),  
“[the ANC’s] bias towards the Indian, African and Coloured people all of whom 
are black is not meant to polarize society but is the most decisive intervention 
towards redress and social cohesion. White compatriots must never feel 
excluded in this important project of building a non-racial, non-sexist, 
prosperous and democratic South Africa”. 
Furthermore, the ANC presents their racial redress as a requirement of the rainbow nation by 
connecting it to reconciliation, social cohesion and nation-building. They argue that 
reconciliation will only succeed if those who suffered the most under apartheid experience a 
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material improvement in their quality of life (Zuma, 2013h; ANC, 2013-2016). Moreover, 
redress, even if racial, consequently aids national building and promotes social cohesion (ANC, 
2013-2016). According to the ANC, the rainbow nation will not be possible while the economy 
retains its racial inequalities. Therefore, they see themselves as motivated by their pursuit of 
the rainbow nation. This reconciles the racialised understanding of the nation implicit in 
‘radical economic transformation’ with their supposed dedication to a non-racial South Africa. 
Alternatively, one should not attempt to reconcile these two views of the nation but treat it as 
the contradiction that it appears to be. In which case the question would be as to why they 
differ. It may be because of the internal nature of the ANC. As I have mentioned in chapter 
four, the ANC consists of different if not contradictory ideologies. The different views of the 
nation may be a reflection of this. Where the support for the rainbow nation can be associated 
with the non-racialism strand within the ANC. Whereas the call to transform the prospects of 
the black nation stem from the faction that prioritises Africanism.  
There is another explanation for these seemingly contradictory constructions of the nation. It 
may be that the ANC is committed to the idea of the rainbow nation but is willing to use race 
where it is politically convenient. ‘Radical economic transformation’ shifts the blame for South 
Africa’s continued socio-economic problems away from them. It frames apartheid as still being 
as the problem. Omitted from this problem representation is the effect of poor governance. In 
which case a racial narrative has more to do with political convenience and scapegoating than 
national identity. 
‘Radical economic transformation’, regardless of what specifically motivated its construction, 
can inadvertently undermine the rainbow nation narrative. This is because of how it is 
perceived. In the literature review, an overview was provided of how some people believe 
racial redress to be contradictory to the ideals of the ‘new’ South Africa. Moreover, racial 
minorities feel alienated by it. Zuma (2014d) takes cognisance of this to an extent with his 
statement that their actions should not be seen as excluding people from the nation. However, 
as people feel as if it does, their sense of national belonging will be affected. 
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4.2 . DA 
4.2.1 South Africa as a civic nation 
The DA does not reject the national identity created in 1994. It is the ethnic nation of apartheid 
that they consider to be problematic. Maimane (2015f) argues that colour has no place in 
defining nationhood. According to the DA, the racial divisions upon which ethnic nations are 
constructed are completely artificial (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014o). Once people 
look beyond race, they will realise that they want the same things in life (Maimane, 2015e). 
Moreover, ‘colour’ should be rejected as the basis of power (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2014o).  
They are very critical of politics that they interpret as ethnic mobilisation (Zille, 2015a). 
According to the DA, the key to the ‘new’ South Africa is to keep racial nationalism of any 
kind out of South African politics (Zille, 2015b; Maimane, 2015f). They emphasise that South 
Africa is now in an era where its people must move away from its historical divisions (DA, 
2014: 64; Maimane, 2015b; Maimane, 2015h; DA, 2013-2016). They repeatedly vow to 
prevent South Africa from ever returning to such divisive politics (Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2015h; Maimane, 2016e; Maimane, 2015g; DA, 2013-2016; Democratic Alliance 
South Africa, 2014f; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014i). According to Maimane (2015j; 
2016i), South Africa will never move forward as a nation if it pursues ethnic mobilisation. The 
DA dedicates itself to leading South Africa away from a racially polarised state and to uniting 
people across fault lines (Zille, 2014a; Maimane, 2015c; DA, 2013-2016). Its rejection of 
ethnically bound nations is a reflection of its implicit support for the civic nation. 
The DA views the current South African national identity to have been established in 1994 
(DA, 2013-2016). This is tacit in how they relate to Mandela. They refer to him as the ‘father’ 
of the nation (DA, 2013-2016; Maimane, 2016f). They argue that the values he represented of 
reconciliation and non-racialism are the values by which the majority of South Africans live 
(Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014b; Zille, 2015b; Maimane, 2016f; Democratic 
Alliance South Africa, 2014n; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016f; Democratic Alliance 
South Africa, 2016g; Zille, 2014c; DA, 2013-2016). They emphasise that he left behind a 
legacy of an inclusive and commit themselves to taking it forward (DA, 2013-2016).  
According to Maimane (2015e; 2015f; 2015a), the DA will work to establish his dream nation 
where colour is irrelevant. They consider themselves as the only party that maintains Mandela’s 
dream of a united, non-racial and prosperous South Africa (Maimane, 2015e; Maimane, 
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2016g). Consequently, they show themselves as now being the party responsible for furthering 
the rainbow nation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2016h; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016i; DA, 2013-2016). This is the implicit 
message of one of their electoral videos. In their electoral video, there is a Mandela voice-over 
of him stating that ‘let there be justice for all, let there be peace, let there be bread for all’. 
Moreover, when this narration occurs, they purposely show the voter choosing to vote for the 
DA instead of the ANC (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016d). 
The DA also indicates that they support the values of the civic nation which the Rainbow 
Nation was meant to contain. Firstly, South Africa can be a single united nation. They 
repeatedly call for South Africans to stand united as one nation (DA, 2013-2016; Zille, 2014c; 
DA, 2014:64). According to Maimane (2016c), creating this single nation despite its divided 
past remains imperative. The DA believes such a shared national identity is possible. People 
can rally around the same values and common humanity to create the ‘new’ South African 
nation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; Maimane, 2015b; Maimane, 2015f; Zille, 
2014b). This reflects their belief in a civic nation given that it is based on shared values. 
Additionally, they see one of the characteristics of the South African nation to be based on is 
non-racialism. They argue that all South Africans should be invested in the establishment of a 
non-racial South Africa (DA, 2013-2016). According to Zille (2015a), non-racialism will be 
the rallying point of the ‘new’ majority. Moreover, the DA commits to pursuing non-racialism 
(Maimane, 2016i; DA, 2013-2016). They identify as non-racial and ‘for all people’ 
(Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015c). 
The DA considers the South African nation as inclusive and illustrates how they share this 
ideal. It is a point of pride for them that they represent South Africans of every race (Maimane, 
2016b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a). 
They especially focus on their growing support amongst black South Africans, especially as 
they have been stigmatised as a ‘white’ party. They do however regard this as a stigma and not 
a reflection. According to Maimane, it is sheer nonsense that there are no black DA supporters 
(Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a). Consequently, the DA calls for the need to break 
through this prejudice (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2015h). 
They do this by emphasising their growing support amongst black South Africans (Maimane, 
2016b; Zille, 2014d). They especially do this implicitly through the use of visual material. 
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Several of their tweets show black South Africans in DA regalia (DA, 2013-2016). Moreover, 
in their electoral videos when they talk about fighting for the rights of South Africans, or state 
that they are representative of all races, these statements are accompanied by visual media 
showing black South Africans (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Democratic Alliance 
South Africa, 2014b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013b; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2013a). 
They have branded themselves as the party for South Africans from all walks of life 
(Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Zille, 2014d; DA, 2013-2016; Zille, 2014f; 
Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a; Zille, 2014a),  a point that they emphasise by 
promoting themselves as South Africa’s most diverse party (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2015b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015c; Zille, 2014a; Zille,  2014c; Maimane, 2015g; 
Maimane, 2016g; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; DA, 2013-2016). This is 
supported with visuals of members of different races and backgrounds united under the DA 
(DA, 2013-2016; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013b; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2014a; Maimane, 2016bi; Zille, 2015b; Maimane, 2016b; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2015b). According to Maimane, the DA “reflects all the dynamics and diversities of 
South Africa” (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014b). 
The DA considers diversity to be a feature of the new South Africa nation. They argue that its 
diversity of cultural practices, languages and histories is the nation’s defining feature post-
apartheid (DA, 2014:64; DA, 2013-2016). They see it as something that should be safeguarded 
and celebrated (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016c; DA, 2013-2016; Maimane, 2016a). 
Moreover, the call for diversity is not seen as divisive. It is seen as an essential part of a united 
South African nation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016h). This view is implicitly 
supported in their electoral videos where they talk about South Africans in the voiceover while 
showing members of different races celebrating together (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2016h), or showing members of different races interacting with one another while draped in 
South African paraphilia (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016h). In accordance with the 
expectations of a civic nation, they see South Africans as being able to transcend their 
differences and remain united. 
While they call for diversity, they emphasise that this is not at the cost of equality. The new 
South African nation should be built on the foundations of mutual understanding and respect 
(DA, 2014: 64). The South Africa they envision will be egalitarian. According to Maimane 
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(2015g), “the war is no longer West vs East, Communism versus Capitalism, Black versus 
White. It is about a contestation for a better tomorrow and a future we can ALL have”. 
Similarly, when they talk about how to build a better South Africa for all, they explicitly state 
that this must be “better for all South Africans black and white, Indian or Coloured” 
(Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014f). Hence, they see equality as an essential part of the 
‘new’ South Africa. South Africa should be a country where all South Africans are equal (DA, 
2013-2016). 
Given South Africa’s racist history, this entails an explicit rejection of racism. The DA makes 
it clear that racism has no place within their party. Their constitution rejects unfair 
discrimination on any grounds (DA, 2015: 9). An act of unfair discrimination is considered as 
an act of misconduct (DA, 2015: 19). Moreover, they state that racists are not welcome in the 
DA (Maimane, 2015b; Maimane, 2015f; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; Zille, 
2014b). Additionally, racism has no place in the ‘new’ South Africa. They call for South 
Africans to stand united against racism and racial mobilisation (Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2016a; DA, 2013-2016). According to the DA, racists should receive no leeway (Zille, 
2014b; DA, 2013-2016) and incidents of racism should be investigated and addressed (DA, 
2013-2016). Racism is shown as contrary to the South African national identity, an attitude that 
is limited to a dwindling minority. Instead, there is the increasing preference of South Africans 
to associate along the lines of values and not race (Zille, 2014b). 
Their stance is reinforced by their support for reconciliation. According to Zille (2015a), “given 
the tragedy of our past, building trust between South Africans is an essential foundation”. They 
do, however, believe that it is possible to move past this history and so establish a new future 
in a democratic South Africa (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014i). The DA urges South 
Africans to follow Mandela’s example of reconciliation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2014o; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; DA, 2013-2016; Maimane, 2016a). They 
specifically call for former ‘nations’ to find common ground and unite (Democratic Alliance 
South Africa, 2014o; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b). 
4.2.2. South Africa as one nation divided between economic insiders and outsiders 
According to the DA, the ideal South African society, is an open opportunity society. There 
needs to be opportunities for all (DA, 2014:8; DA, 2015:5; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2016z; Maimane, 2015a; DA, 2013-2016). They argue that by providing opportunities for all, 
the South African triple challenge will be addressed (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014e; 
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Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015a). It will resolve South Africa’s unequal playing field, 
which will allow every South African to pursue their best life (DA, 2013-2016; DA, 2015:5). 
Their proposed solution consists of two separate yet related parts. 
Firstly, the DA believes that ‘opportunities’ should be available. Their proposed solution is job 
creation. They explicitly link it to the aim of their envisioned opportunity society where job 
creation is seen as an essential means to improve people’s quality of life (Democratic Alliance 
South Africa, 2014l; DA, 2013-2016) as well as the key to social mobility, given that they 
represent possibilities that people can utilise to lift themselves out of poverty (DA, 2013-2016; 
DA, 2014:8; Zille, 2014d). 
According to the DA, the best way to ensure that there are sufficient opportunities is via job 
creation. They depict job creation as the DA’s priority (DA, 2013-2016; DA, 2016:2; 
Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015j; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Zille, 
2014c). Moreover, they argue that it should be the priority of the South African government as 
well (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014c; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n; 
Maimane, 2016b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014d; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2014g; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014h; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2014m; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016e; DA, 2013-2016). Practically, they see job 
creation as the result of policy decisions. Hence, they believe that parties with the best policies 
will be best at stimulating job creation (DA, 2013-2016). The state does not need to be a job 
creator but it needs to create an environment conducive to job creation. 
Consequently, the DA views the problem of unemployment as the product of a lack of 
opportunities (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2014n; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016e; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016i). 
They specifically attribute the blame to the government’s inability to stimulate sufficient job 
growth (Maimane, 2016b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013b; Democratic Alliance 
South Africa, 2013a; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014c; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2014j; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016l; DA, 2013-2016). According to the 
DA, the rise in unemployment is the defining feature of the Zuma administration (Democratic 
Alliance South Africa, 2014m; DA, 2013-2016; Maimane, 2016f; Maimane, 2016d; DA, 
2014:1, 4; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2014e; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b; Zille, 2014g; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2016h; DA, 2013-2016). 
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Secondly, the DA believes that opportunities should be available for all. This means creating a 
system where opportunities are unrestricted and outcomes are determined by effort. They 
acknowledge that apartheid had a lasting legacy, one that has kept the black majority excluded 
from opportunities. As a solution, the DA supports BEE (DA, 2013-2016). However, they 
argue that for BEE to be a viable solution, it must first be ‘fixed’ (Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2014c; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014k). This fix would entail the policies to 
be broad-based. They argue that BEE must benefit the many not only the few with political 
connections (DA, 2013-2016; Zille, 2015b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n).  
As a standard, they will see whether or not BEE policies contribute to job creation (DA, 2013-
2016). Where BEE creates jobs, the DA considers it as beneficial. They argue that BEE is then 
a means to ensure that all South Africans have equal access to opportunities (Maimane, 2015d; 
Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014j; DA, 2014:5). Moreover, it will ensure that all those 
who were previously disadvantaged will benefit and so address racial inequality (DA, 2013-
2016). Hence, they call for BEE that creates ‘jobs not billionaires’ (DA, 2014:18; DA, 2013-
2016; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014c; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014k). 
Thus, the DA considers it problematic that people have restricted access to opportunities. This 
is in part because of the current version of BEE. According to the DA, “[BEE] policies so far, 
while well-intended, haven't created real, broad-based empowerment that'll improve the lives 
of ordinary [South Africans]” (DA, 2013-2016). The DA argues that BEE as it is at the moment 
does not create a level playing field. On the contrary, it is shutting out those who lack political 
influence (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014o), including those it is meant to assist. They 
argue that BEE is problematic because the policies are not empowering the many but enriching 
the few (Maimane, 2015d; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b; DA, 2013-2016). Hence, 
they see them as failing as that they do not bridge the “divide between economic insiders and 
outsiders” (DA, 2013-2016). 
The DA argues that this culture of insiders and outsiders extend beyond BEE policies. Maimane 
(2015ni) argues that it has developed into a culture where opportunities are reserved for insiders 
who have political connections (DA, 2013-2016; DA, 2014: 3; Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2016b; Maimane, 2015h; Maimane, 2015i; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014g; 
Maimane, 2015ni). These are the select few. Most South Africans are locked out of 
opportunities as most South Africans are not politically connected (Democratic Alliance South 
Africa, 2014a; DA, 2013-2016). Hence, the DA indicates that they consider the problem to be 
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that “instead of opportunities for all, we only see opportunities for some” (DA, 2013-2016; 
Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015h; 
Maimane, 2016zi; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n). 
The DA’s problem representation of a closed crony society is based on their liberal ideology. 
They believe that individuals should have the ability to determine their quality of life by their 
efforts, not by their birth (DA, 2013-2016). This is only possible where opportunities are 
equally available to all and outcomes are the reflection of effort and ability (DA, 2013-2016). 
Currently, this is infringed upon by the lack of opportunities as well as an unequal playing 
field.  
The DA takes cognisance that the apartheid legacy has restricted people’s access to 
opportunities so active measures are needed to address it. According to the DA, “people mustn't 
be held back by arbitrary criteria; gender, religion, or colour, or by prejudice of those in power” 
(DA, 2013-2016). Similarly, they consider it an evil of apartheid that South Africa has been 
divided into groups of haves and have-nots based on race (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 
2014i; DA, 2013-2016). 
However, even as they support racial redress, the DA endeavours to minimise the extent their 
actions are seen as racial. Firstly, they consider race and disadvantage as distinct even if they 
believe that a significant correlation between race and disadvantage remains (DA, 2014: 18; 
DA, 2013-2016). Secondly, they emphasise that redress policies are considered as transient and 
subject to regular review (DA, 2014: 18). Lastly, their problem representation conceptualises 
people as insiders and outsiders. Hence, they show that their priorities remain providing 
opportunities for all. At the moment that would entail economically empowering people, taking 
race into consideration. Hence, they show that their redress policies are not about race per se 
but about individuals who have been denied access to opportunities on the basis of race. 
Therefore, the DA does not consider people as being alienated by South African national 
identity. They are divided into those who are excluded from the economy and those who are 
not. In this regard, race is an influencing factor but not conclusive. Moreover, they do not see 
this a failure of South Africa as a nation, a sentiment that is reinforced by their statement that 
there is nothing wrong with the South African identity or people. The fault lies with its 
government (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b). Consequently, they promote a 
narrative where South Africans remain included in the South African nation even if their 
government has failed to include them in the economy.  
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4.3. EFF 
4.3.1 Rallying behind black nationalism 
The EFF does consider the ‘Rainbow Nation’ a problem. It does not see it as the beginning of 
South Africa as a civic nation. Instead, they view it as a very unsatisfactory compromise, one 
that did not replace the previous system of racial oppression by the white nation but instead 
allowed for its continuation. They interpret reconciliation as a movement towards politics of 
class collaboration (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015c). They believe that attempting to 
reconcile interests of the workers and bosses is impossible. In their view, the ANC has become 
social partners with the bosses at the cost of the workers (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015c).  
The bosses are inevitably white and the workers inevitably black as a result of apartheid. 
Moreover, they have maintained this ‘false unity’ with white capital into the post-apartheid era 
(Ndlozi, 2014c).  
Therefore, the EFF does not see the transition as creating a new South African identity. Instead, 
Ndlozi (2016a), argues that the ANC became co-opted into supporting the old one (Ndlozi, 
2016a), an identity that was based on race and racism. They describe the nationalism that 
follows as one of ‘house niggers’ and cowards (Ndlozi, 2013a). The intention of their ‘toothless 
African nationalism’ is to suppress the black nation in protection of white interests (Economic 
Freedom Fighters, 2013c; Ndlozi, 2013a). They attribute this to the black elite’s self-hatred, 
which has informed their actions since the transition (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c; 
Ndlozi, 2013a). Hence, the black elite has internalised ideas of white supremacy. According to 
Ndlozi (2016a), they are conditioned like ‘house slaves’ to believe they will be doomed without 
their white masters, a stance they see reiterated in the current government’s all white legal 
council (Ndlozi, 2016b; Ndlozi, 2016d). They see the ANC as not only failing to transform 
South Africa but protectors of so-called white privilege (Ndlozi, 2016a; Ndlozi, 2016a). 
The EFF does not see reconciliation as a means to an equal and inclusive nation. Instead they 
interpret it as the language of the bosses that they ‘trained’ the black elite to speak. Talk of 
peace and reconciliation is intended to keep the ‘black’ folk on its knees while distracting from 
the bosses continuing gains (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c). They consequently see the 
post-apartheid nationalism to be akin to the one before 1994 where nationalism promotes white 
supremacy while asking black people to accept the ‘scraps’ (Ndlozi, 2013a), instead of 
promoting black people to pursue a national discourse that is in their own interest (Ndlozi, 
2013a). 
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Thus, the EFF views the 1990s peace process as a means to lull people into complacency while 
white supremacy continues (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015h; Malema, 2016b) where the 
‘peaceful’ laws and reconciliation discourses have taken the place of explicit racist laws 
(Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c; Ndlozi, 2013a). South Africans now have to “wake up 
from the long dogmatic sleep of peace and reconciliation and fearlessly pursue economic 
justice and freedom in our lifetime” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c).  
They do not reject the possibility of a reconciled South Africa. However, they argue that 
reconciliation still needs to be earned (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016d). According to the 
EFF, for there to be genuine reconciliation, South Africa must move away from the Mandela 
type reconciliation (EFF, 2013: 7, 8; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016d; Malema, 2015; EFF, 
2013-2016). Genuine reconciliation will only be possible if accompanied by economic 
reconciliation (Ndlozi, 2013c; Mokoena, 2015a; EFF, 2013-2016). Hence, they used 
Reconciliation Day 2015 to issue a warning that reconciliation has not yet occurred. Moreover, 
they argue that the reconciliation discourse is evil unless it is accompanied by radical economic 
changes (Ndlozi, 2015g); otherwise it asks blacks to keep enduring colonial conditions while 
the beneficiaries keep benefitting from the system (Ndlozi, 2013c; Mokoena, 2015a; Ndlozi, 
2015g). 
Their critique of the ‘post-liberation’ nation is also reflected in their stance towards Mandela. 
As a symbol of the ‘reconciled nation’, they are very critical of him, arguing that he “preached 
reconciliation at the expense of our people” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016d; EFF, 2013-
2016). Moreover, he and other leaders “usurped the leading role of the workers on the ground” 
(Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015c) in favour of the bosses, thus reaffirming their stance that 
the national identity was not changed with the political regime. 
However, they also lauded him for the ‘political gift’ that he and his fellow fighters gave black 
South Africans (Ndlozi, 2013b; Ndlozi, 2014a; Ndlozi, 2014e; Ndlozi, 2015d). This more 
positive stance on Mandela comes from them reinterpreting their symbolic attachment to him, 
arguing that he understood the need for economic emancipation, which is why he pursued 
political freedom. They depict him as a ‘reputable Freedom Fighter’ whose commitment to 
Freedom in our Lifetime gained fruition (Ndlozi, 2013b). They now want to take his vision 
further by continuing the quest for economic freedom (Ndlozi, 2015d). They also challenge the 
connection between him and reconciliation. They argue that “Mandela was willing to lead an 
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armed revolution to restore a country where black people can live without fear, prejudice and 
as fully human” (Ndlozi, 2014e).  
Moreover, the EFF depicts race and racism as still being the foundation of nationhood in South 
Africa. This is illustrated in how they claim that the racial nations are still in conflict with one 
another, where the black nation specifically is trying to overcome its continued oppression.  
This is evident in their demands to decolonise South African spaces. They call for all apartheid 
symbols and statues to be removed (EFF, 2013-2016; Ndlozi, 2015a; Ndlozi, 2015b; Ndlozi, 
2015e; Ndlozi, 2015f; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g; Ndlozi, 2016d) as well as the 
removal of ‘die Stem’ from the national anthem (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016a; Ndlozi, 
2015c; Ndlozi, 2015e). In addition, English must be used as the sole medium of instruction 
(Ndlozi, 2016c; Ndlozi, 2016d). Lastly, street names should be changed to stop exalting 
‘apartheid agents’ (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They rationalise these demands on 
the basis that these are all symbols that perpetuate white supremacy or celebrate racists so they 
need to be removed. Until they are, Mokoena (2015a) argues, apartheid rules out of the grave. 
They similarly see parliament as being a contest between the nations. They describe it as still 
being a place of the elite, colonisers and apartheid agents (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). 
They also reject the celebration of the Union Buildings arguing that they are rooted in a ‘union’ 
that contributed to black dispossession and was given its name by white settler forces (Ndlozi, 
2013c; EFF, 2013-2016). They argue too that the white minority hates the EFF’s behaviour in 
parliament specifically for undermining this colonialist legacy (Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2016g). 
They also show antagonism and oppression as still defining the relations between racial 
nations. According to Ndlozi (2016a), anti-black racism has been normalised in South Africa 
and whites comfortably display their continued belief in white supremacy in public (Ndlozi, 
2016a). The EFF’s ideas are rejected solely because they are made by black people (Economic 
Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They specifically also present black professionals on the basis of 
their ongoing subjugation in the workplace (EFF, 2013: 2; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). 
They argue that institutionalised racism remains alive (Ndlozi, 2016a). According to Ndlozi 
(2013h), the “EFF notes that the struggle to humanise black people…is far from complete”. 
The EFF also argues that it will be impossible for white people to consider blacks with anything 
other than disgust and hate until there is a systematic change in the latter’s socio-economic 
conditions (Ndlozi, 2016i). The EFF has a structural view of racism. Malema argues that white 
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supremacy rests on socio-economic inequality (Malema, 2016b). This inequality has continued 
into the post-apartheid era during which the EFF argues most black people’s material 
conditions have not been changed (Ndlozi, 2015g). They are still subjugated by being kept as 
a source of cheap and disposable labour (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c; Ndlozi, 2016d; 
EFF, 2013-2016). This has been the intention of colonisation: to provide a way for a white 
minority to exist in a black majority community (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c). Until 
this changes, the EFF argues, South Africa’s colonial nature will persist (Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2013c). According to Malema (2016c), whites’ feelings of racial superiority 
specifically will go unchanged.  
Moreover, the EFF unabashedly shows themselves as pursuing the promotion of the black 
bation. They describe themselves as representatives of the black majority (Ndlozi, 2016f; EFF, 
2013: 7, 8). One of their aims is “to attain and defend the National and Liberation of the 
oppressed black majority” (EFF, 2014b). They also describe themselves as “fighting for the 
black nation in particular” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They depict the EFF as the 
product of the black nation, the political party that has been “formed and manned by blacks 
and will change the lives of black people” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They are not 
advised or funded by any white man is a point of pride for them (Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2016g). Moreover, they call for a “municipality owned by black people that will prioritise the 
black community” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). 
The EFF is specifically in pursuit of the restoration of the dignity of black people (Economic 
Freedom Fighters, 2013a; Ndlozi, 2014d). They have consequently allied with Black 
Consciousness and Pan-Africanists who have similar goals (Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2015). The EFF incorporates the teachings of Steve Biko who argued for the importance of 
black people to love themselves and not allow themselves to be subjugated (Ndlozi, 2013a; 
Ndlozi, 2014c; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). 
Hence, the EFE does not consider a South African nation to have been established. They 
believe that the nation is ethnically bound still. Where the black nation is identified by their 
skin colour but also by their shared experience of oppression.  
4.3.2 The landless black nation in South Africa 
According to the EFF the economy needs to be transformed (Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2015d), meaning that it needs true transformation (EFF, 2014: 3; EFF, 2014b), indicating that 
they do not consider previous attempts as valid. According to the EFF, the economy needs to 
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be changed so that the country’s wealth is equally shared to the benefit of all South Africans 
(EFF, 2016: 4; EFF, 2016: 2). They note that Africans in particular must benefit from this 
change (EFF, 2014b). Their solution aims at addressing at the current deeply unequal 
distribution of wealth in South Africa (EFF, 2014: 7). For this to be addressed, the EFF argues 
that the land question needs to be resolved.  
Land expropriation without compensation is non-negotiable to the EFF (Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2015; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d; 
Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g; EFF, 2014b; EFF, 2013: 7-8, Ndlozi, 2016f; EFF, 2013-
2016). They believe that land should be expropriated for equal distribution (EFF, 2016: 9; 
Ndolzi, 2015l; Ndlozi, 2016d; EFF, 2013-2016). According to the EFF, this is the only solution 
to the racially skewed land ownership patterns in South Africa (Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2013b). Moreover, it is seen as necessary to restore the dignity of the people (Ndlozi, 2015e).  
Practically their solution is to amend section 25 of the Constitution (Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2015). To do so they are willing to support the ANC in parliament to form the 
necessary two-thirds needed to make constitutional changes (Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2016g; Malema, 2014a; Mngxitama, 2014; Tshabalala, 2014; Ndlozi, 2014b; EFF, 2013-2016), 
hence making way for legislation that will allow the state to expropriate land without 
compensation.  
Their proposed solution indicates that they believe that the government should not have to 
spend money on land restitution. Their problem representation is that the ANC is ‘buying back 
stolen land’ (Malema, 2014a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013b; Mngxitama, 2014; Ndlozi, 
2014b). According to Malema (2014a), “[the government] must be prepared to expropriate the 
land of our people, which was forcefully stolen from them”. 
Their problem construction emphasises that land was illegally acquired during the colonial era 
and it is now in the hands of ‘colonial settlers’ and ‘land thieves’ (Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2015). According to Malema (2014a), land is consequently owned by a “few white people who 
illegally got it through colonial dispossession” (Malema, 2014a). They do not see this as 
acceptable. Their emphasis on the illegality of the acquisition reinforces their view that the 
government should not be reduced to buying back stolen property (Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2013b). Hence, their call for the Constitution to be amended. The amendment would 
end the legal requirement that the government must pay for ‘stolen’ land.  
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They consider policies that suggests payment for land restitution to be problematic. For 
example, they reject restitution given that it is based on the willing-buyer-willing-seller 
principle (Ndlozi, 2014b). According to Ndlozi (2016p), they reject that any money should be 
spent on land redistribution given that it was acquired by the commitment of crime against 
humanity. They also attribute the low rate of land redistribution to the adherence to this 
principle (Malema, 2015b) arguing that it relies on ‘land thieves’ who are unwilling to sell 
(Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). They also reject the Expropriation Bill which they see as 
another extension of this ethically unjustifiable logic (Ndlozi, 2016e). The only difference it 
introduces is that the government no longer needs to have a consent from those it wishes to 
expropriate land from for public use (Ndlozi, 2016e).  
They reject that it addressed the colonial question of land. They critique that it has taken twenty 
years to distribute 7 per cent (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2016a). At this rate, it will take 100 years for the issue to be rectified (Economic 
Freedom Fighters, 2015a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016a; Mngxitama, 2014). The result 
is that the land remains in the hands of imperialists following the pre-apartheid land theft 
(Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d), with the result that the black majority is congested in 
less than 20 per cent of the land while the land remains owned by those who colonially took it 
through committing black genocide (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016a; Malema, 2016a). 
Their solution and problem representation of the land issue are based on the assumption that 
the land belongs to all, more specifically, that it belongs to black people. This is implicit in 
their continued emphasis that current land ownership is the result of its illegal acquisition. 
Similarly, they state that the green African continent signifies that the land that must be restored 
to its people (EFF, 2014b). They also state that the black people are the original people of the 
land and that they must be respected as such (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016d). Hence, 
their call for land to be restored to their rightful owners (Ndlozi, 2015d), a call which is 
reiterated by statements such as the “[the land] belongs to us, all of it” (Economic Freedom 
Fighters, 2015d). Moreover, this is why the EFF does not see illegal occupation as illegal as 
they do not see the land as being legally owned (Ndlozi, 2014di). 
According to Ndlozi (2014z), the current ownership is racist and anti-black and it is 
maintaining South Africa’s colonial structure (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). This 
sentiment they reinforce by their terminology such as describing the owners as settlers. 
Moreover, they depict it as a racial issue where they argue that land redistribution has not yet 
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succeeded because the ANC is too invested in protecting white interests than they are in solving 
the issue (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013b; Ndlozi, 2014b). They argue that until it is 
addressed blacks will suffer the same oppression and racism from whites as they did under 
apartheid (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). 
Hence, it is evident that the EFF continues to see South Africa as being defined by competing 
ethnic nations. They are motivated by their desire to end the suppression of the black nation 
via the pursuit of black nationalism. Nevertheless, they reject that this should be seen as them 
wanting to oppress white people. They make the point that they hate white supremacy, not 
white people (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015e). They claim that “we want [whites] here” 
(Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g) and that land redistribution is not at the exclusion of 
white people (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g; EFF, 2013: 9). Land redistribution will be 
pursued in a manner that promotes intra-racial as well as inter-racial equality (Economic 
Freedom Fighters, 2016g; EFF, 2013: 24; Shivambu, 2013; Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2016g). This land redistribution “should apply to all South Africans, black and white” (EFF, 
2013:9). 
They argue as well that their actions are meant to promote the peace outcomes of 1994, not 
undermine them. According to them, the democratic aims of 1994 will be impossible until the 
black nation is freed and land redistribution is an essential ingredient of genuine reconciliation 
and consequently democracy. Ndlozi (2016o) argues that without land our democracy traps the 
whole society into a fast approaching time bomb. Social cohesion and democracy are currently 
being undermined by the historically oppressed suffering from poverty, indignity and 
unemployment while, in contrast, the beneficiaries of the murderous apartheid regime continue 
to thrive (Ndlozi, 2015g). Hence, the EFF does not consider their view of national identity as 
inevitably resulting in racial suppression one way or the other. Rather, these nations can 
harmoniously coincide but this is dependent on the black nation being established as the white 
one’s equal.  
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter shows that the ANC, the DA and the EFF believe that the different racial groups 
can peacefully co-exist as equals in South Africa. They, however, come to that conclusion with 
very different views of the nation. Both the ANC and the DA show that they still regard South 
Africa as the Rainbow Nation. Where they both understand this to be a reflection of the civic 
nation. They agree that there is shared South African national identity. Additionally, that this 
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identity extends beyond cultural and other differences. That citizens can celebrate their 
diversity but that the national identity transcends these differences. As a result, diverse people 
remain united. They are united by shared values. The ANC and the DA both agree that non-
racialism unites South Africans. 
Both agree that too many South Africans are excluded from the economy. The ANC’s problem 
representation of these economic challenges emphasises their exclusion on the basis of race. 
This can be interpreted as them believing that it is necessary to apply racial categories to rectify 
the racialised legacy left by apartheid. Consequently, they argue for a racialised solution, which 
they argue is done in pursuit of the civic nation. However, this discrepancy can also be 
explained by the ANC’s ideological heterogeneity or as an attempt by the ANC to avoid being 
held responsible for poor governance.  
The DA takes a similar stance regarding racial redress but attempts to distance itself from the 
racial narrative. They focus on how the government is failing the people by not providing them 
with the necessary opportunities. They argue that South Africa as a nation should not be 
adversely judged for the failure of its government.  
The EFF believes in equality. They, however, believe in the equality of nations. They do not 
see the ‘Rainbow Nation’ as promoting inclusivity and equality. According to the EFF, national 
identity changed in 1994 only to the extent that the black elite were co-opted into the apartheid 
narrative. They see South Africa as still consisting of racially bound nations. They consider 
reconciliation and peace as possible but conditional. It is dependent on the end of the oppression 
of the black nation. The EFF argues that this is based in the landlessness of the black nation. 
Hence, reconciliation will only begin with the return of their land.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis looked at how the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation. It 
specifically kept in mind the features of ethnic and civic nations, given that in 1994 the South 
African nation was meant to be re-articulated as a civic nation as to distinguish the ‘new’ South 
Africa from its past. The ANC and the DA share an understanding of the nation even if their 
internal logic differs. In contrast, the EFF rejects the rainbow nation on the basis that they see 
it as another of oppressing the black nation.  
What follows is a short summary of the thesis and then a discussion of the findings. The latter 
will illustrate that the rainbow nation remains a relevant construction of the nation in post-
apartheid South Africa. This is in part because of the continued support that it continues to 
receives from South Africa’s two largest political parties. The EFF, however, attempts to 
challenge the status quo by re-interpreting the rainbow nation and by promoting an alternative 
construction of the nation in South Africa. 
The ANC’s and the DA’s supposed commitment to the construction of South Africa as rainbow 
nation does not however guarantee its future. This is partly because this thesis is limited to 
what these political parties say. It is beyond the scope of this research to consider the actions 
of the political parties. The rainbow nation will not be viable unless it supported by deeds as 
well. Moreover, South Africans will not immediately benefit from this collective national 
identity. This means that the proponents of the rainbow nation must be dedicated to this ideal 
in the long run, even if there are immediate political costs.  
5.2 The construction of South Africa as a nation  
This thesis researched how the ANC, the DA and the EFF constructed South Africa as nation. 
It began by looking at how the nation is defined as at term. It specifically looked at what 
distinguishes the ethnic nation and the civic nation. The ethnic nation is based on exclusive 
identity defined by a cultural aspect. While it is not inherently conflictual, it has been associated 
with oppressive system and conflict where ethnic nations are set up to compete with one 
another. In contrast, civic nations are very inclusive. It extends to everyone with a historic 
connection with a territory. It creates a shared national identity that crosses cultural differences. 
The type of national identity can influence the how social capital is influenced by diversity. 
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Most modern countries contain heterogenous populations. This ethnic and racial diversity can, 
however, negatively impact social capital in that society. As a result, people become more 
withdrawn from collective life and less willing to trust one another. Putnam (2007), however, 
argues that this does not have to be the inevitable result that diversity has on a community. He 
argues that the creation of an overarching identity allows a society to balance diversity with 
social solidarity. This inclusive identity is then used to create new forms of social capital in the 
long run. His description of such a collective identity is similar to how a civic national identity 
is characterised. Hence, a civic national identity, more than an ethnic national identity, can be 
used minimise the adverse effects that diversity has on social capital. Given that it takes time 
to rearticulate social identities, the benefits of this civic nation may not be felt in the short run. 
Neither ethnic or civic nations are established in perpetuity. This thesis showed how the nation 
can be regarded as a social construct and therefore remains subject to change and challenge. 
South Africa used the transition from apartheid to a multi-racial democracy to re-articulate 
national identity in South Africa. Whereas national identity was defined by race under 
apartheid, a civic national identity would be created for post-apartheid South Africa. The latter 
referred to a nation where people would be united in their diversity and be inclusive of all who 
lived in South Africa. This was the vision of post-apartheid South Africa that was enshrined in 
the Constitution.  
However, the rainbow nation has failed to retain its momentum in post-apartheid South Africa. 
A review of the literature illustrates that post-1994 South Africa has failed to live up to the 
expectations of its people. Moreover, the South African national identity has not yet begun to 
foster social capital in a significant manner in South Africa. Non-racialism has not united South 
Africans under a single national identity and interracial tensions have not been sufficiently 
addressed. The social distance among members of different races is worsened by socio-
economic inequality and the lack of nation-building. As a result, the notion of the rainbow 
nation has been losing traction under post-apartheid South Africa.  
Political parties can capitalise on this discontent by offering an alternative construction of the 
nation. A construction the South African nation that rejects the interdependence promoted by 
the civic national identity may benefit its proponent in the short run but will adversely affect 
social capital both in the short run and the long run. This led to the question of how the ANC, 
the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation given that they, as organisations that 
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contain the political elite, may stand to gain from re-articulating the South African national 
identity.  
Bacchi’s (2004) concept of problem representation was applied to official political party 
documents and their social media to research their respective constructions of the nation. This 
concept was applied to parties’ discussions of the nation. What they considered as 
‘problematic’ was interpreted as being against their respective constructions of the nation. 
‘Problem representations’ was also used to examine the underlying assumptions parties had 
about the nation, which were promoted by their respective constructions of policy issues.  
Despite the critique levelled against it, the rainbow nation remains politically salient in South 
Africa. The ANC and the DA both commit themselves to the construction of South Africa as 
the rainbow nation, regardless of the parties being political opponents and very different in 
terms of history and ideology. Their interpretation of this national identity is also similar. Both 
political parties describe South African as being united nation based on inclusivity and equality 
where racism is isolated from the current national identity. Both emphasise the break from the 
previous era and highlight their adherence to this new vision. They respectively depict 
themselves as non-racial and celebrating a South Africa united in its diversity. Additionally, 
they both indirectly show their support for the rainbow nation as it was imagined in 1994 by 
lauding Nelson Mandela as father of the nation and by expressing their support for 
reconciliation. 
The ANC and the DA do not only attempt to show their support for this construction of the 
nation, both political parties attempt to establish themselves as the proponent of the rainbow 
nation. The ANC tries to establish ownership over this discourse by emphasising their role in 
its establishment, as well as by the link between the ANC and Mandela as the figurehead of 
this ideal. Their language is also meant to illustrate them as never deviating from this ideal. 
This ignores the internal ideological tension between Africanism and non-racialism within the 
ANC, but is meant to uniquely position the political party as the heirs of the rainbow nation. 
This position is challenged by the DA. The DA cannot dispute the ANC’s historical relation 
with this construction of the nation and all that it entails. They nevertheless try to usurp the 
ANC as the political representative of the rainbow nation by emphasising that the ‘ANC has 
changed’. According to the DA, the ANC is no longer organisation that it was under Mandela. 
Th current leadership is depicted as having abandoned the values that have previously defined 
the organisation and are now only motivated by self-enrichment. As a result, the DA has 
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‘stepped forward’ to protect this construction of the nation. Their language use speaks of their 
commitment to the ideas of Mandela and how they, more than any other party, are now best 
suited to carry forward his ideas. 
In contrast, the EFF rejects the construction of South Africa as the rainbow nation. According 
to the EFF, this construction of the nation is problematic because it does not constitute a re-
articulation of collective identity in South Africa. According to the EFF, the nation is not 
understood differently to how it was seen under apartheid. Unlike the ANC and the DA, the 
EFF describes the current collective identity, to emphasise its similarities to pre-1994 identities. 
They do not distinguish the two because they believe that the biggest difference between the 
apartheid and the current era, is that the latter is being upheld by self-hating blacks. The 
narrative of the rainbow nation and reconciliation are therefore not seen as establishing a united 
South African identity but as another means of lulling black South Africans into accepting their 
oppression.  
They do not see South Africans as sharing a national identity. According to their construction 
of the nation, South Africa is still a country that contains different ethnic nations, which are 
specifically grouped according to race. The relationship between these nations have remained 
antagonistic and oppressive, an issue they do not seek to resolve by establishing a civic nation, 
but by fighting for the equality of the black nation. The EFF has capitalised on the 
fragmentation within South Africa and provide a very ‘us versus them’ understanding of the 
nation. 
Nevertheless, even as the EFF challenges the dominant national construct, they make use of it. 
They have retained some of the language associated with the Rainbow Nation but use it to 
promote their understanding of the nation. For example, reconciliation is beneficial for South 
Africa but genuine reconciliation is conditional and has not yet been attained. They laud Nelson 
Mandela not as a figurehead of the rainbow nation, but as a freedom fighter. Hence, they 
selectively find value in the 1994 national identity. 
5.3 The future of the rainbow nation in South Africa 
The construction of South Africa as the rainbow nation creates a shared national identity that 
transcends ethnic and racial differences in South Africa. This can help South Africa to balance 
its diversity with the need for social cohesion given that this national identity creates a new 
collective ‘we’ which South Africans can use to address the social distance apartheid created 
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among races left and to create new forms of social capital. South Africans will benefit from the 
increase of social capital given that where social capital is higher, people are healthier, happier 
and democracy is advanced.  
The ANC and the DA are the two biggest parties in South Africa and their support for the 
rainbow nation should bode well for this construction of the South African nation. However, 
this construction of the nation is faced with obstacles, which makes its future a more 
contentious issue. Firstly, it takes effort to redefine social identities. Therefore, the creation of 
a sustainable South African identity requires more than lip-service. Action needs to be taken 
for the vision of the rainbow nation to be realised.  
This is acknowledged by both the ANC and the DA who concur that a shared South African 
nation will not be possible unless it is accompanied by socio-economic change. Similarly, both 
parties agree that racism should be actively confronted. Both these actions will help to reduce 
the social distance among races. One of this thesis’s limitations, however, is that it does not 
consider the actions of the political parties. Therefore, it cannot be determined whether or not 
the ANC’s and the DA’s action corroborate their stated constructions of the rainbow nation. 
Secondly, it takes time to create a new and inclusive identity and the benefits are not 
immediately felt. Hence, Putnam’s (2007) argument that a shared social identity will alleviate 
the adverse effects of diversity in the long run.  Part of the critique against the rainbow nation 
stems from the fact that people are not yet feeling the benefits from this construction of the 
nation. According to Putnam (2007), greater diversity is expected to have negative implications 
on the community in the short run. It is only over time that a shared identity will alleviate these 
negative implications.  
One of the problems with modern politics, however, is that it is geared towards the more 
immediate future. Political parties aim to win support through popular elections. National 
elections are held every five years and these are interspersed with local elections. This is not 
enough time to establish a civic national identity that will reduce the negative impact that 
diversity has on social capital. Therefore, there is limited political incentive for a political party 
to devote themselves to a construct of the nation whose benefits will only be realised. Nor is it 
guaranteed that these societal benefits will be translated into political gain. It could be argued 
that the ANC and the DA are competing for the ‘ownership’ of the rainbow nation in attempt 
to consolidate any resultant with their respective political party.   
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However, where the construction is faced with widespread critique such as with the rainbow 
nation, it may cost its proponents like the ANC and the DA political support. The EFF rejected 
the interdependence promoted by the civic construction of the nation and has grown rapidly 
during its short existence. Thus, the party has benefited from highlighting ethnic and racial 
differences. This may be an easier way to gain political support in the short run but the 
promotion of racial ingroups and outgroups will be detrimental to South Africa in the long run. 
The future of the rainbow nation will consequently be determined by exactly how dedicated its 
supporters are. They must be willing to support it even though it is not conducive to their 
immediate political goals. It must be consistently supported over a long period of time and 
cannot be abandoned once it becomes politically expedient to do.  
This is unlikely to happen for the DA in the foreseeable future. The DA has been stigmatised 
as a ‘white’ party. It has, however, managed to largely overcome this stigma by presenting 
itself as a diverse party where everyone is welcome. This position has allowed it to grow among 
minorities groups. Its support among racial minorities has, however, been maxed out. For it to 
grow further it needs to be seen as an attractive to a larger proportion of the black population 
as well. To do so while maintaining its traditional support base, the party needs to promote a 
vision that reduces the salience of race in the public sphere. This is also in line with their liberal 
ideology, which argues that individual identity should be regarded as primary. Its liberal 
orientation and its diverse support base makes its unlikely that the DA will easily forsake the 
civic construction of the nation. 
The ANC’s continued support for the rainbow nation is less certain. Unlike the DA, the ANC 
does not need to court different races because the vast majority of South Africans are black. 
Moreover, the ANC’s internal heterogeneity makes it challenging to predict a consistent party 
position. The ANC has several factions and numerous ideological influences, including 
Africanism. This internal diversity means that there can be multiple ways of viewing the nation 
within the party all at once. Future research should consider intraparty politics when exploring 
how the ANC constructs the South African nation. Additionally, the ANC’s position as political 
hegemon is under threat for the first time since they came into power in 1994. In light of greater 
political challenge, the political party may be tempted to follow the EFF’s example of pursuing 
political support via divisive politics.  
Therefore, the future of South Africa as the rainbow nation is not guaranteed. It is dependent 
on its proponents’ ability to withstand the political expedience of divisive politics. There are 
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socio-economic problems that this construction of the nation will not be able to resolve. 
However, this does not mean that the value of a united and inclusive South African identity 
should be taken for granted or discarded. South Africa will lose much in terms of social capital, 
if the benefits of a civic national identity should be sacrificed for the political convenience of 
divisive politics.   
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